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As for the philosophers, they 
make imaginary laws for imaginary 
commonwealths, and their discourses 
are as the stars which give little 
light because they are so high. 
———Bacon. 
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Since the beginning of written history, the ideal condition for the 
progress and development of the human race has been that status which 
ire call peace.    In spite of the fact that the political, economic, 
cultural,  religious and social history of mankind is the story of 
brute force,   of self-interest,  of ethnocentricity,  of intolerance, 
and of class struggle,  there have been individuals living in the midst 
of these conditions who came to believe in the possibility of irorld 
peace and international order.    It -was from the horrors of war and 
the injustices of peace treaties,  from deep-seated dynastic plots for 
revenge, from the Christian inspiration of universality, from the 
ruthless play of the balance of power, that men of the seventeenth, 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were motivated in their formulation 
of peace projects* 
These men had as their intellectual heritage the ideas of federation 
and arbitration practiced by the Greeks in such organizations as the 
Delphic Amphicytony.    World peace had been achieved in the Pax Romanaj 
but this was an enforced national peace,  in no sense resulting from a 
league of independent nations.    In the next phase of European history 
the Church assumed leadership in the political as well as the spiritual 
realm, effecting,   in a very real way, the common unity of Christendom. 
The papacy afforded Europe a supreme and final arbiter.    While world 
peace was never completely secured either by the universal church or 
by the revived universal empire, the idea of the unity of civilization 
was a real force throughout the Middle Ages.    The rise of the spirit of 
nationality and the birth of the modern national state system were 
potent factors in the breakdown of this conception.    Rulers cast aside 
the political philosophy of the Middle Ages with its acknowledgement of 
the natural law and the compact and substituted,  instead, a philosophy 
based on the Roman Law.    Their claims to absolutism were supported by 
a rising group of theorists who recognized no moral obligations and no 
limitations on the powers of the monarch.    Reason gave way to sheer 
ruthless force, and the claims to absolute power made themselves felt 
in the international order as well as in the national.    Any hopes that 
might have survived for a world federation through religion were made 
impossible by the Protestant Revolt, which produced fanatical rivalry 
and barbarous warfare among Christian groups.    Europe lost a common 
international authority, and in its stead was raised the sovereign 
national state, which alone was the judge of its own conduct and obli- 
gations • 
It was the original intent that this paper should discuss the active 
attempts at the formations of a concert or a confederation of Europe 
in the seventeenth,  eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, with equal 
emphasis on the theoretical plans of philosophers and statesmen, and 
the diplomatic actualities, in short, the peace treaties concluded 
during this period bearing on the formation of such an international 
order.    The peace plans, none of them with the possible exception of 
the Holy Alliance ever put into practice,  offer no difficulty to the 
preconceived purpose of this study.    The peace treaties,   the cold-blooded 
results of nationalism, power,  dynastic feud, and the heartless reality 
of politics, do not fit into the original acheme of this paper.    The 
agreements involved are the various settlements commonly called the 
treaties of Westphalia, Utrecht, and Vienna.    Each of these European 
settlements ended long periods of nationalistic wars and attenpted in 
their provisions the elimination of the cause of wars.    Each of them 
had a definite function in the evolution of Modern Europe—the recogni- 
tion and establishment of the European States System by the Treaty of 
Westphalia, the acceptance of the balance of power of the instrument 
of the states system by the Treaty of Utrecht, and the acknowledgement 
of the concert approach by the Congress of Vienna.    Nevertheless, the 
active formation of a confederation of Europe MM not considered or 
attenpted by the treaties of Westphalia or Utrecht.    They remain as 
necessary stepping stones to the partial realization of the concert 
principle at the Congress of Vienna.    Without Westohalia and Utrecht, 
the policies of Vienna would have been impossible, would have been 
without foundation and necessity.    Thus the first two European settle- 
ments are significant in this study as the founders and adjustors of the 
states system which could produce, in the nineteenth century, an active 
realization of the Concert of Eurooe. 
Grand Design of Henry IV of France published after hi3 death in 1610 
It is to Henry IV, king of France, and to his minister of finance, 
Kaximilien de Bethune, due de Sully, that tve attribute the most 
famous of the many projects advocating a federation of states in 
order to secure and maintain peace among nations.* Historians 
have long debated the authenticity of the Grand Design, presented as 
the idea conceived by King Henry with the sanction of Queen Elizabeth, 
in the Memoires of the due de Sully. Nevertheless, the scheme shall 
be discussed here from the viewpoint which Sully chose to create for 
it. Sully is careful to explain the need of a revised European 
order and he stresses the thought that to admit the existing political 
organization of Europe meant to renounce every hope for a lasting 
peace. His supporting reasons are three: a glance at the map of 
Suro-e, he asserted, is sufficient to make one realize that the ter- 
ritories which were in the possession of different 3tates -were so 
unequal in size and natural resources that there could not be any 
question about the balance of power—the corner-stone of a society 
aiming to maintain peace; another cause of unrest lay in the fact 
that the peace treaties, in allowing a territory to become an integral 
part of a state, did not take into consideration the principle of 
nationality; and finally, one could hardly hope for lasting peace 
before freedom of religious thought and worship had been granted.2 
The Grand Design would have Europe divided in such a way that 
the balance of power and the principle of nationality be maintained; 
1. Sylvester John Hemleben, Plans for fforld Peace Through Six 
Centuries, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 19k3),  31. 
2. Elizabeth V. Souleyman, The Vision of World Peace In Seventeenth and 
and Eighteenth-Century France, {Uerr lorTT:    Cf.T. Putnam's Sons, 
i9hi)7'20.  
small states should receive some parts of the large ones rath a 
population homogeneous to that of the former's main territory. Thus 
Europe would be divided into fifteen dominions of about the same 
size as follows: Six hereditary monarchies—France, Spain, Great 
Britain, Sweden and lion-ray, Denmark, and Lombardy( consisting of 
Piedmont and Milan)} five elective states—The Holy Roman Empire, 
the States of the Pope, Hungary, Bohemia, and Poland; and four 
republics—Venice, the Netherlands, the Helvetian Republic and the 
Italian Republic (consisting of Florence, Genoa, Parma, Modena, 
liantua and Lucca).1 The plan is to have the borders of the 
Europeans states so placed that powerful and ambitious princes 
would realize the vanity of any effort toward expansion and thus 
spare other monarchs the torments of suspicion, jealousy, and fear.2 
The main idea of this rearrangement was the altering of the 
map of Europe at the expense of the Hapsburgs, the other participant 
in the dynastic feud of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
The House of Austria was to be divested of the empire and of all of 
its possessions in Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. Spain, all 
that would remain of Hapsburg power, would be given the following 
possessions in order to have equality with the other European nations: 
Sardinia, Majorca, Minorca, and the other islands on its coast; the 
Canaries, the Azores, Cape Verde, and the possessions in Africa; 
Mexico and the American islands which belonged to it; the Philippines, 
Goa, the Moluccas, and its other possessions in Asia.3 
1. Sully, Maximilien de Bethune, Memoirs of the Duke of Sully, 
(London: George Bell and Sons, 106$), IV, 2l<1^2Uu 
2. Souleyman, op. cit., p. 21. 
3. Sully, op_. cit., p. 238. 
This severity was just and necessary, Sully maintained, because 
of the ambition of the House of Austria to achieve universal monarchy, 
an ambition made evident by the conduct of Charles V and his son In 
the latter part of the sixteenth century.    Naturally the House of 
Austria would never subscribe to a plan that was designed to assure 
the predominance of its rival, the Bourbons; therefore a last 
European war seemed unavoidable, and Sully praises the foresight of 
Henry in the treaties of assistance signed with England, Sweden and 
the Protestant princes of Germany.    One notes with interest and 
alarm that the basis of European peace was to be established on the 
foundations of war. 
Speaking of this Christian Republic, Sully becomes quite a 
dreamer:    he anticipated the brotherhood that would prevail among 
its membersj one would be inclined to cherish ambitious plans in a 
society where ambition was not likely to lead anywhere.    All matters 
of general interest, especially those that might lead to conflicts, 
would be under the jurisdiction of the General Council.1    Consisting 
of the plenipotentiaries from all Christian governments, it would 
be a permanent organization; the delegates,  some sixty-six of them, 
constantly assembled, would deliberate on the political,  civil and 
religious affairs of Europe, and above all they would try to pacify 
the disputes.    France,  England, Spain, Germany and the Holy See would 
send more delegates and have more votes than any other powers.2    The 
General Council would be assisted by six Local Councils whose functions 
would be to regulate matters of secondary importance in different 
regions.    In all cases, the award of the General Council was to be 
irrevocable. 
1. Ibid., pp. 239-2UO. 
2. T63H.,  239. 
A Court of Arbitration, composed of elected senators from 
all members states, constituted the judicial body. In case of 
non-subnission to the sentence of the Court of Arbitration, 
international armed force would be used. The command of this 
international army with men and expenses apportioned to each 
member country according to its population and prosperity, was 
to be in the hands of the General Councilj its mere existence was 
to be a major factor in the preservation of peace.1 
The settlement of the religious question had a prominent 
place in the Grand Design. In the Christian Republic three 
Churches were to be admitted on equal footing: the Catholic, the 
Lutheran, and the Calvinst. It may be that the religious wars of 
the sixteenth century and the horrors of the Inquisition had taught 
Sully and Henry IV the advisability of tolerance. It is most 
interesting to note that the religious settlement advocated in the 
Grand Design is quite similar to the actual solution that was reached 
in the Peace of Westphalia some forty years later. Sully*s clear 
insight into the religious problem is expressed best in his an words: 
Each of these three religions being now established in 
Europe in such a manner that there is not the least appearance 
that any of them can be destroyed, and experience having 
sufficiently demonstrated the inutility and danger of such an 
enterprise, the best therefore that can be done, is to preserve 
and even strengthen all of them, in such a manner, nevertheless, 
that this indulgence may not become an encouragement to the 
production of new sects or opinions, which should carefully be 
suppressed on their first appearance. . . .All therefore, that 
remains now to be done, is to strengthen the nations, who have 
made choice of one of these religions, in the principles they 
profess, as there is nothing in all respects so pernicious as 
a liberty in belief; and those nations, whose inhabitants pro- 
fess several, or all these religions, should be careful to 
observe these rules which they find necessary to remedy the 
ordinary inconveniences of toleration, which, in other respects, 
they probably experience to be beneficial.2 
1. Ibid., 252. 
2. IBIS., 235. 
A certain order and a definite procedure were to be established to 
secure the peaceful coexistence of these three religions. In case 
of disputes among them, they would be obliged to submit to arbitra- 
tion. In states like France where the population is divided between 
two Churches one of them would be considered as governing so long as 
the ruler neither changed his denomination nor v/as succeeded by a 
ruler of a different denomination. Subjects who disliked this type 
of regulation could leave the country. "Sully1s view on toleration 
is simply the orthodox cujus regio, eius religio",! 
In this system for a federation of Europe, France would neither 
play the part of the aggressor nor declare war. Her ambition was to 
assume the role of mediator and peacemaker on the continent of 
Europe without aiming at any prerogatives or territorial acquisitions: 
Besides, what is it that France wants? Will she not always 
be the richest and most powerful kingdom in Europe? It must be 
granted. All, therefore, which the French have to wish or desire 
is, that Heaven may grant them pious, good and wise kingsj and 
that these kings may employ their power in preserving the peace 
of Europe; for no other enterprise can, truly, be to them either 
profitable or successful.2 
Thus, the Christian Republic, the pragmatic federation, the 
arrangement of the states of Europe in such a way as to obliterate 
forever the possibility of the rise of Hapsburg domination, was to be 
formed by Henry IV. Sully ends his discussion of the proposed Design 
with the statement that only under the vigorous leadership of a 
Henry IV could such a scheme be employed.3 
In conclusion, it is evident that the Grand Design broke away 
definitely from the early and medieval idea of a world state. It was 
1. Souleyman, op. cit., p. 26. 
2. Sully, op. cxt., p. 225. 
3. Ibid., pT 2W~ 
an attempt to reconcile the two opposing demands of early seven- 
teenth century Europe—national independence and world organiza- 
tion.1 Quite apart from the question of authenticity, the Grand 
Design is vrorthy of independent consideration as an important 
contribution to irenist theories and as the real starting-point 
of many later schemes for perpetual peace. It is not difficult 
to distinguish between its elements of permanent and temporary 
value. On the one hand, it might be considered as merely an ideal 
sketch of what Richelieu nearly achieved and wiiat Henry IV may have 
dreamt of doing, with the added attraction of a League of nations 
scheme; and on the other hand, it must be remembered that Sully 
enunciated an important principle, not rediscovered until the 
twentieth century, that in the complications of modern warfare the 
plight of the victor may, economically, be at least as bad as that 
of the vanquished. 2 In its details the Grand Design shows some 
historic sense. Considerable insight is shown in the classification 
of the participating states according to the types of constitution 
for which they are best adapted; room is left for the old interna- 
tional organizations of Empire and Papacy; and, while there is no 
violent breach with the past, there is a recognition of the 
importance of the new republicanism.3 
The Grand Design of Henry IV as explained by Sully has a 
peculiarly modern flavor. Apart from its immediate purpose of 
subduing the Ilapsburg power, the Design evidences an acute 
political insight. While it was never utilised by the generation 
for whom it was intended, it is the opinion of this writer that 
1. Hemleben, op. cit., p. UO. 
2. David Ogg, Europe in the Seventeenth Century, (London: Adam 
and Charles Black, ±Vhi),   (?» 
3. Ibid., p. 80. 
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that this plan, formulated amid doubtful circumstances in the very 
early years of the seventeenth century, had a marked,  if unconscious, 
effect on the political history of the European 3tates system. 
The Grand Design of Henry IV was the most influential of all 
similar plans.    The Abbe Saint-Pierre, William Penn, Rousseau,  and 
others took it for their model.    For instance, Williim Penn was 
thinking of Henry's suggestions when he wrote in justification of his 
own scheme:    "I will not then fear to be censured for proposing an 
e:q)edient for the present and future peace of Europe, when it was 
not only the design but glory of one of the greatest princes that 
ever reigned in it."1   Henry's plan was perhaps the basis of 
Alercander's Holy Alliance.    Walter Allison Phillips speculates that 
its influence may have extended to Hapoleon I at St. Helena in tho 
formulation of his plan.    Whether the Grand Design actually 
influenced Napoleon may be left to speculation.    Its actual effect, 
however, upon successive plans is demonstrable, and no project of 
a league to enforce peace has carried more prestige with later 
builders of similar projects.2 
One has only to consider the foreign policy of Louis XIV and his 
ministers to see the practical effect of the scheme envisioned by 
Henry IV and Sully.    The alliance against the House of Ilapsburg, 
the erctension of the natural frontiers, and the placing of France 
at the head of the table in the family of European states were 
certainly similar in the theoretical musings of Henry and the 
diplomatic actualities of Louis. 
1. Hemleben, op.  cit., p. U0. 
2. Ibid., p. UT. 
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Seventeenth Century Background 
The significance of the Thirty Years War and the document 
that it produced in the Treaty of Westphalia must be prefaced by 
some understanding of the European political scene early in the 
seventeenth century.    It was an era of critical transition.    If 
the church had occupied the central stage during the religious 
revolutions of the sixteenth century, the national state, repre- 
sentative of the secular emphasis, became the focal point of 
seventeenth century activities.    These activities of the national 
territorial state -..-ere in the main directed to military and 
economic enterprises.    In this century the Empire and the Papacy 
were definitely relegated to positions of little more than 
academic interest,  the religious motive was over-shadowed by the 
economic,  the first practical proposals for religious toleration 
and international arbitration were formulated, and the main 
conceptions of the system known as the Ancien Regime were defined 
and applied.^ 
France,  in lol$, was potentially the most powerful nation in 
Europe.    The balance of power was in her favor and fortunately 
there were ministers lilce Richelieu and Uazarin who were able to 
manipulate royalty and peasants to make of France a united and 
powerful country.    The Dutch had taken their place by the 
beginning of the century as a prosperous commercial nation, their 
extraordinary prosperity creating deep envy and prompting attacks 
by the French on land and by the English on the sea.* 
Scotland joined with England in 1603, and during the century 
1. Ogg,  op. cit.,  p. 1. 
2. Geoffrey Bruun, Eurooe in Evolution,   (New York:    Houghton 
Mifflin Company", ±W5)>  2U2. 
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the English Parliament became more arrogant than any nrevious 
representative body.    The struggle between the king and the commoners 
led to civil MV (161I2-16U°) and was finally resolved after a second 
rebellion in 1688-168? by the establishment of a limited,  constitu- 
tional monarchy. 
In Northeastern Europe the notable development of the century 
was the aggressive ascendency of the Swedes who made the Baltic Sea 
a Swedish lake,   interfered in the Germanics,   in Poland, and in Russia, 
and overawed the neighboring states of Denmark-Norway and Finland. 
The Protestant Revolt had increased the wealth and autocratic power 
of the Swedish rulers; the development of mining made Swedish 
foundries the foremost in Europe;  and the combination of royal power, 
artillery,  superbly trained infantry, and commercial prosperity raised 
S.;eden temporarily above her weaker and less warlike neighbors. 
For the Holy Roman Empire and the German states the seventeenth 
century was an epoch of agony and diseaster.    The division of power 
between Protestants and Catholics established by the Peace of Augsburg 
(1555) proved unstable.    By 1615 all the factors were present which 
could precipitate a religious war; hostilities commenced in Bohemia 
in 1618, and for over a generation the Thirty Years War laid waste 
the richest and most populous regions of central Europe. 1 
1.    Ibid., pp. 2li2-2U3. 
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The Treaty of Westphalia, 16U8 
The rebellion in Bohemia, punished two years later by the hang- 
ing of twenty-six rebels in Prague, led to a European war unique in 
its length, its constant shifting of scene and motive, its dreariness 
and ferocity. There were but few great personalities involved; the 
generation ending the war had long since outlived the intrigues tliat 
began it. Gathering momentum as it proceeded, considered interminable 
by those who suffered from its ravages, it was ended only by the 
exhaustion of the combatants and the perpetuation of injustices and 
resentments breeding future wars. This melancholy struggle gave 
birth to the first modern peace congresses which, in attempting to 
stabilize the frontiers of Europe, brought into prominence a great 
cause of unrest in modern times—the Rhine frontier. The Thirty Years 
war retarded the civilization of Germany by more than a century and 
the destinies of Europe and of peace have been profoundly influenced 
by that fact.1 
The Thirty Years War was the last of the religious wars to which 
the Reformation bid given rise in Europe. It began in 1618 with the 
attempt of the Protestant nobles of Bohemia to substitute the Calvinist 
Elector of the Palatinate for their Catholic Hapsburg king. The war 
spread throughout Germany, and became a contest between the Reforma- 
tion and the Counter-Reformation. Foreign.powers intervened: Spain 
came in from the beginning because she was a great Catholic power, 
allied by family ties to Austria; the Butch joined in the struggle, 
because they were fighting their War of Independence against Spain, 
Gustavus of Sweden came in during I63O, in order to aid his fellow 
1. Ogg, op. cit., p. 118. 
•«. 
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Protestants, and to keep the Hapsburg Empire from extending itself 
into the Baltic at the expense of Swedish ambitionj in I63U France 
under Richelieu, joined the STredish side in the war, not indeed with 
the object of helping protestantism, but in order to check the power 
of the Empire and the establish the Rhine frontier.1 Thus, French 
ambition transformed the Thirty Years War from a territorial-religious 
struggle into a dynastic war.2 In 16U8 with the Peace of Westphalia, 
the Thirty Years war came to an end. 
The religious and territorial settlements reached in these three 
treaties were necessarily prefaced by a declaration of the restored 
peace of Europe: 
Article 1. That there shall be a Christian and Universal 
Peace, and a perpetual, true, and sincere Amity, between his 
Sacred Imperial Majesty, and His most Christian Majesty; as also, 
between all and each of the Allies, and Adherents of his said 
Imperial Majesty, the House of Austria, and its Heirs and 
Successorsj but chiefly between the Electors, Princes, and States 
of the Empire on the one side; and all and each of the Allies of 
his said Christian Majesty, and all their Heirs and Successors, 
chiefly between the nost Serene Queen and the Kingdom of Swedcland, 
the Electors respectively, the Princes and States of the Ennire, 
on the other oart. That this Peace and Amity be observ'd and 
cultivated with such a Sincerity and Zeal, that each Party shall 
endeavour to procure the Benefit, Honor and Advantage of the 
other; that thus on all sides they may see this Peace and Friend- 
ship in the Roman Empire, and the Kingdom of France flourish, by 
entertaining a good and faithful neighborhood.3 
This declaration of peace is followed by a unique statement of 
forgiveness and amnesty, far reaching in its intended scope and 
indicative of the many future statements of sdxiilar intent and 
impracticality: 
II. That there shall be on the one side and the other a 
perpetual Oblivion, Amnesty, or Pardon of all that has been 
committed since the beginning of these Troubles, in what place, 
or what manner soever the Hostilities have been practiced, in 
1. 
2. 
3. 
R. B. Mowat, The European States System, (Iondon: 
University Press. I5>2?;, 1U. 
Ogg» op_. cit., p. 119. 
Oxford 
1* 
such a manner, that no body, under any pretext whatsoever, 
shall practice any Acts of Hostilities, entertain any Enmity, 
or cause any Trouble to each other; neither as to Persons, 
Effects and Securitys, neither of themselves or by others, 
neither privately nor openly, neither directly nor indirectly, 
neither under the colour of Right, nor by the way of Deed, either 
within or without the extent of the Empire, notwithstanding all 
Covenants made before to the contrary: That they shall not act 
or permit to be acted, any wrong or injury to any whatsoever; 
but that all that has pass'd on the one side, and the other, 
as well before as during the War, in Words, Writings, and 
Outrageous Actions, in Violences, Hostilities, Damages and 
Expenses, without any respect to Persons or Things, shall be 
entirely abolished in such a manner, that all that might be 
demanded of, or pretended to, by each other on that behalf, shall 
be bury'd in eternal Oblivion.1 
Since the original cause of the Thirty Years War was called 
religious in nature, the solution of the problem as offered by 
Westphalia would detemine in large part the future of militant 
religiosity. The year 162U Yfas chosen as the normal year in 
reference to which the tvro religious parties were to hold or 
surrender church lands—a measure favorable to Catholics, because 
in l62h the Protestant cause in Germany was at its lowest ebb.2 
The main effect of this was to confirm the Protestantism of north 
Germany and the Catholicism of southern Germany. 
The treaty guaranteed mutual toleration of Calvinism, Lutheranism 
and Catholicism.3 The same principle that Sully would have utilised 
in his Christian Republic was used in the religious settlement of 
Westphalia—cujus regio, eius religio. Similarly, dissatisfied 
subjects were allowed, under the terms of the treaty, five years in 
which to settle their affairs and leave. When the Imperial Diet had 
to handle religious matters involving Catholics and Protestants, it 
was accorded the jus eundi i£ partes, whereby it automatically divided 
into two sections representing each religion, and as such matters ?rere 
1» Ibid., p. U. 
2«  Ugg, ££. cit., p. 179. 
3« JJowat, op. cit., p. l£. 
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of frequent occurence, the division of the Diet into two unconnected 
parts made it more helpless than ever.l    Though German princes were 
given the right to enforce conformity by the threat of expulsion, 
the right was not always exercised, because so sparse v/as the German 
population in 16U8 that rulers were anxious to see an increase rather 
than a decrease of their taxable subjects.     It is therefore, interesting 
to noto that toleration entered not by the enlightenment of rulers of 
diplomats, but by economic pressure.    Soon Brandenburg and Holland 
were to prove that toleration and prosperity combine easily. 2    And as 
mutual toleration became the law of the Empire (for the treaty concerned 
only the States of Germany), the principle which it contained became 
the pattern for all northern and ultimately, for all western Europe.3 
In short, man ceased to fight over sacraments, because a new idol, 
indeed a new god in the shape of the modern national state had risen 
before himj now it would be to the state that fanatical devotion was 
owed. 
And the Treaty of Westphalia serves as the midwife of the modern 
national state.    The territorial provisions of the Peace of Westphalia 
sanction and establish this new states system in Europe.    France 
received by the treaties the three bishoprics of Lletz,  Toul and 
Verdun, with Moyenvic,  Breiasch, the fortress of Pinerolo and the 
right to garrison Philippsburg, and full sovereignty of Alsace.^    This 
transfer of Alsace in 16U8 from Germany to France initiated the estab- 
lishment of an irredenta for both nations, the cause of deep-seated 
resentment among common people, the symbol of militant nationalism in 
the nineteenth century.    But France emerged from the conferences of 
1. Ogg, or>. cit., p. 179. 
2. C. V.wedgewood, The Thirty Years War,  (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1939)731^ 
3. Mowat, op. cit., p. 1$. 
k« Ogg, op. ci¥77 p. 177. 
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Westphalia with the territorial acquisitions of her choice and the 
prestige of the most powerful nation in Surope.l 
For her part in the last ten years of the war, Sweden received 
Western Poraerania, the bishoprics of Bremen and Verden, the towns of 
Wisraar and Stettin, the island of Wollin, the territory at the mouth 
of the Oder River, and an indemnity on the condition that Swedish 
troops leave all other German territory.2 Thus Sweden became an 
important German power with the right to be represented in the Diet, 
and with the first of the many footholds that she was to acquire in 
the Baltic Sea. 
The independence of the Dutch nation, in force since the begin- 
ning of the century, was recognized by the Treaty of Westphalia. 
Belgium, then known as the Spanish Netherlands, was not granted 
independence and remained under the Crown of Spain. Consequential 
to the establishing of Dutch independence was the fixing of the 
frontier between the United Netherlands and the Dutch Netherlands. 
Brandenburg received Eastern Ponerania, and the bishoprics of 
i.Iinden, Halberstadt and Cammin, in addition to the right of succession 
to the Archbishopric of Magdeburg. Brandenburg obtained these secula- 
rized lands mainly through the influence of France, which acted as 
"Benevolent god-mother to the infant Hohenzollern state."3 Among the 
miscellaneous clauses was included provision for the full independence 
of Switzerland.k 
Of course Germany was the paramount problem. It was agreed that 
each of the German Imperial states should be free to make alliances 
1. Anton Gindley, The History of the Thirty Years War, (New York: 
G. P. Putnam^ sons., HT0H77 U» 2JU 
2. Ogg, op. cit., p. 178. 
3. Ibid., p."T78. 
h.   TEIcT., p. 170. 
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with foreigners, provided such alliances were not directed against 
the Empire.    No question of making or interpreting lair,  declaring 
war, imposing taxes, levying soldiers, raising fortifications or 
concluding peace were to be decided unless with "the consent of the 
Free Assembly of all the States of the Empire."1   The question of 
reform of the imperial administrative machinery was proposed but 
postponed.    The treaty confirmed this territorial independence of 
the German princes and so completed a process which had long been 
manifest.    It amounted practically to the resignation of the 
Emperor from all control over German politics,  for the feeble bonds 
which still held the German states to the Empire could easily be 
dissolved.    As there were about three hundred and fifty separate 
political entities in Germany, the possibilities of diplomatic 
intrigue were immensely increased. 
The treaty of Westphalia came to be considered as a great 
instrument of public law,  standardizing that state system of Europe 
and providing authoritative guidance in any dispute threatening to 
upset the equilibrium which it established.    This policy of equili- 
brium continued to be the sole guarantee of right between states.^    if 
the Peace of Westphalia established the main principles of the state 
system for pre-Revolutionary Europe,  it then has definite bearing 
on the problem of this paper, for whithout the foundation which it 
afforded,  the evolution of the states system to the Concert level 
would have been impossible. 
The assembling of a general conference vras the first acknowledge- 
ment that the results of a war were of concern to powers that had 
I 
1. Ibid.,  p.  180. 
2. Wyndham A. Bevies, Gathered Notes on the Peace of Westphalia, 
(London:    Grotius Society, ±T$k)> '(!• 
•« 
2$ 
taken no active part.1    This conference attcmped a task -which still 
engrosses European diplomacy.    It confirmed the sixteenth century 
conception of a secular state, linked commercially with its neighbors, 
but always potentially antagonistic to them.2    It discredited two 
old institutions—the Empire and the Papacy—both of which had at 
least claimed to base authority on something more than brute force. 
The Papacy had monopolized the right of deciding among combatants 
which side had divine sanction; from this time on it would be 
difficult for any combatant to assert ercclusive partnership with 
divinity.    The medieval Holy Roman Empire had united men of diverse 
race and language in a confederation claiming to be the sole 
repository of the imperial traditions of ancient Rome and a bulwark 
of Western civilization against the encroachment of the barbarians; 
the future would see in the intensification of linguistic and racial 
distinctions and the establishment of newer not on tradition but on 
battalions.     For the imperial is substituted the national; medieval 
universality gives way to racial self-consciousness; religious 
bigotry is succeeded by territorial greed.3    And the practice of 
states being represented at all capitals, the acceptance of the 
profession of diplomat, would facilitate international relations of 
a peaceful nature.^ 
With the problems that it raised, political,  social and economic 
in nature,  the Peace of Westphalia remains as the first effort to 
reconstruct the European states system.    Few treaties had such 
1. Ibid., p. 66. 
2. gjjELj p. 6U. 
3. Ogg., op. cit., p. 180. •    g.> p_£
.    Bewes,  op.  cit.,  p. 65. 
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influence, and Europe is said for the first tine to have formed a 
kind of "conmonwealth -watching with anxiety over the preservation 
of the general peace."-1- 
1.    Authur MacDonald,  Fundamental Peace Ideas, Including the 
"SYestphalian Peace Treaty ^16UiQ~and the League of liations, 
:ieprlnted from the Congressional Record", July 1,   1919. 
Washington:    Government Printing Office,  1919), 5, 
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Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, 1625 
The Peace of Westphalia has an epilogue that is of the upmost 
importance in the hopes of European peace. De Jure Belli ac Pacis 
published in l62£ by Hugo Grotius, was inspired by an earnest desire 
to noderate the suffering and devastation brought about by the Thirty 
Years War. Amid the general wreck of institutions Grotius sought 
substitutes for the lost authority of Europe. Looking around him at 
the general havoc which -war had made the nations hostile, the 
faith of ages shattered, the passions of men destroying the common- 
wealths which had nourished them Grotius decided that Europe 
possessed a single common bond, the vestige of its former unity, the 
human mind. To this he made his appeal and upon its deepest convic- 
tions he sought to plant the Lav; of Nations. 1 
Beginning with the idea that there is a kinship among men 
established by nature, Grotius sees in this bond a community of rights. 
In these rights which men hold in common because of their status as 
men, Grotius finds d.  common denominator. The so9iety of nations, 
including as it does, the whole human race, needs the recognition of 
rights as much as mere local communities do. As nations are but 
larger aggregations of individuals, each with its own corporate 
coherence, the accidents of geographical boundary do not obliterate 
that human demand for justice which springs from the nature of man as 
a moral being. There is, therefore, as a fundamental bond of human 
societies, a Natural Lair, which, when properly apprehended, is perceived 
2 to be the expression and dictate of right reason. 
1. Hugo Grotius,  The Rightd of War and Peace,  Including the Law of 
Nature aricOations, Erans. TTZ. Campbell.    (NewTorkT" IC 
Walter Dunne,  lyoz), 2. 
2. Ibid., p.  8. 
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The inspiration of De Jure Belli ac Pacis was the love of 
peace, yet Grotius was not one of those visionaries who totally 
condemn the use of armed force and proscribe all war as wrong and 
unnecessary. On the contrary, he seeks to discover when, how, and 
by whom war may be justly conducted. 
In the interest of peace, Grotius maintains that there are 
"Three methods by which independent nations may settle their dis- 
puted rights without coning to the decision of the sword."! 
VII The first method is that of conference. For, in the 
words of Cirero, 'there being two methods of deciding quarrels, 
the one by discussion and the other by force, the former a 
peculiar characteristic of man, and the latter, of the brute 
creation: when the first of these methods fails, men are 
obliged to have recourse to the latter.' 
VIII The other method is that of compromise, which takes 
place between those, who have no common judge....Surely then it 
is a mode of terminating their disputes, balancing their powers, 
and settling their pretensions worthy to be adopted by Christian 
Kings and States....These and many other reasons of no less 
importance might be advanced for recommending to Christian powers, 
general congresses for the adjustment of their various interests, 
and for compelling the refractory to submit to equitable terms 
of peace. 
IX A third method of terminating disputes, without hostilities, 
was by lot, a practice commended by Dion Chrysostom in his speech 
on the interposition of fortune in directing his affairs, and it 
was commended long before him by Solomon in the xviii chapter of 
his Proverbs.' 
An acceptance of Grotius' theories would considerably limit the 
number of wars, because he excludes from the category of just war 
all wars of conquest or revenge. A just war is fought for only one 
reason—to escape extermination; it would be waged solely by men with 
whose lives the State could easily dispense; peaceful occupations would 
be interfered with as little aspossible and the convenience of non- 
1. Ibid., p. 276. 
2. IPTCT., pp. 276-277. 
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combatants would be consulted. Although many of Grotius' proposals 
for international conduct have been embodied in Hague conventions, 
his schemes are in reality as idealistic as those of Sully; Grotius 
allows war, but at the sane time robs it of its essential elements  
its misery, waste and cruelty.1 
Thus the three instruments—the Grand Design of Henry IV, the 
Peace of Westphalia, the Rights of War and Peace by Grotius—diverse 
as their purposes and results may be, were significant in the 
European peace movement of the first half of the seventeenth century. 
The Grand Design has inspired like proposals in men of all generations; 
the Peace of 'Westphalia brought all Europe together as nations for the 
first time and there set the stage for the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries; Hugo Grotius, because of his acute political insight and 
high ethical standard, both qualities incorporated in his book, has 
cone to be considered as the father of modern international law. 
The first instrument provided for a theoretical federation among 
European nations for the preservation of peace; the second was the 
result of war and the diplomatic negotiation of the newly risen 
national state; the third called for recognition of the common bond 
between men, the settlement of disputes by methods other than warfare, 
and a high moral and ethical standard adhered to by all men, making 
unity something more than a federation—rather instead, a brotherhood 
of men. 
1. Ogg, op_. cit. p. 5fj0. 
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Pro jet de Paix Porpetuelle of the Abbe' Saint-Pierre 
/   ; 
The Abbe Saint-Pierre had by 1707 sketched out his ideas for 
securing everlasting peace and he published the complete work at 
Utrecht in 1713 under the title of Pro jet pour rendre la paix 
perpetuelle en Europe.    The Grand Design is the foundation of the 
work of the Abbe Saint-Pierre, who had the shrewdness to shelter 
himself under the popular name of Henry IV, and presented his scheme 
as a mere elucidation of the work attributed to the king.    But in 
reality the Projet did better than elucidate the Grand Design.    That 
offered, in opposition to the pretensions of the House of Austria to 
universal monarchy,  a republic of Christian States.    The Abbe carried 
the idea further,  developed it,  and transformed it by his method of 
formal proof.    Instead of confining hijnself like some of his prede- 
cessors, to generalities, he had the merit of drawing up practical 
regulations for the establishment of a European Diet.^ 
To secure a permanent peace the twenty-four Cliri3tian nations of 
Europe, maintained within the frontiers assigned to them by the Treaty 
of Utrecht, are to form among themselves a Grand Alliance or European 
Union.    The twenty-four States are each to nominate a delegate, two 
substitutes, and two agents to take the place of the substitutes; 
large and small States are to have equal representation.    The twenty- 
four delegates are to constitute the Senate of Peace which is to sit 
permanently at Utrecht.    The President of the Senate is to be called 
the Prince of Peace.    To secure the independence of the Seriate he is 
to change each week.^ 
1.    Charles Francois Irenee Castel de Saint-Pierre, Abbot of Tiron. 
Scheme for Lasting Peace,  Selections from the Second Edition 
of the A*b"rene da Project de Paix Perpetuellg7 Trans, by 
ITT HTBallot, Uknaoni    Peace~Boolc Co., 123?), 3. 
2.Jbid., p. U. 
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In case of dispute between two States, the States in disagree- 
ment must first seek reconciliation through the obligatory mediation 
of the rest of the members of the European Union.    In the event of 
failure of mediation, an award or arbitration becomes necessary.    It 
is rendered by the Senate of Peace, which becomes above all a tribunal, 
a permanent and compulsory Court of Arbitration.    The award is to be 
made first, provisionally, by a plurality of votes.    The definitive 
award is only to be made five years later and must be adopted by a 
majority of three-fourths,1    To be sure, the Abbe did not wish to 
encourage hasty actionj    Such an award will be guaranteed by armed 
force.    This army vrill be composed of a special contingent of troops 
furnished by each State under the command of a generalissimo, appointed 
by the Senate of Peace, 
Three reasons induced Saint-Pierre to build his plan on the status 
quo; first, he sees in it a good starting point; second, he finds that 
history justifies the principle (he uses as an exarale the Gorman Con- 
federation which, built on the basis of the validity of the last treaties, 
could boast of centuries of lasting peace); and third, he thinks that 
a Union of Peace should start with peace and not vdth war.      Obviously, 
he does not share Sully's opinion that a last great war must precede 
the establishment of a peaceful federation.    He cites the advantages to 
be gained by the recognition of the status quo as real advantages to 
each member.    There would be no hope for enlarging the territory of a 
state,  but there would be no risk of losing even the smallest part of It. 
Saint-Pierre takes great pains in his "first discourse" to stress 
the futility of the efforts to secure a lasting peace either by treaties 
1.    Ibid., p. 6. 
'IS, 
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or the system of the balance of povrer. Treaties are promises not 
backed by any kind of guarantee. As for political equilibrium, he 
compared it to good scales: the slighest weight put on one of the 
scales turns it. A similar thing takes place in the relations 
between political bodies: the rulers of nations differ so much in 
mental ability* force of ambition, and intensity of warlike spirit 
that the balance of power is indeed a very unsteady balance,* The 
condemnation of the system of the balance of pov;er published at 
the exact time of the sanction of this system by the Treaty of 
Utrecht is perhaps indicative of the lag between possibility and 
actuality, between theoretical reason and the brute force political 
occurrence. The Abbe described it: "The order of Europe today is 
determined more largely by passion than by reason. We are in civil 
relations with our fellow citizensj^ but with the rest of the world, 
we are in a state of nature".3 
Saint-Pierre has definite arguments in favor of twenty-four 
nations represented by the same number of delegates j he regards 
this number as high enough to prevent plots and petty intrigues, 
and low enough to secure the efficient and speedy work of the Congress.^ 
The twenty-four nations that Saint-Pierre intended should join the Union 
are France, Spain, England, Holland, Savoy, Portugal, Bavaria and 
Associates, Venice, Genoa and Associates, Florence and Associates, 
Switzerland and Associates, Lorraine and Associates, Sweden, Denmark, 
Poland, The States of the Pope, Muscovy, Austria, Courland and Associates 
(Danzig, Hamburg, Iubeck, Rostock), Prussia, Saxony, Palatine and 
1. Souleyman, op. cit., pp. 79-81* 
2. "Fellow citizens"" referes to Frenchmen. ,„,.,  ,«„.»    /T    A 
3. Walter A. Philips, The Confederation of Europe,  1B13-1823,   (London: 
Longmans, Greene""S: Co., xyilij* 2D7 
h,    Souleyman, op_. cit., p. 8£. 
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Associates, Hanover and Associates, Ecclesiastical Electors and 
Associates.1 
This was,  for the Abbe Saint-Pierre, a practical and unfailing 
means to secure the realization of a great idea, the establishment 
of perpetual peace among nations.    He did not consider this idea from 
the Christian point of view; that had been the approach of Pascal,^ 
for example.    He did not consider it from the point of view of a pure 
philosophers this was to be, towards the end of the century,  the 
approach of Kant.    The Abbe took for the foundation of his structure 
the golden rule:    "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you". 
This golden rule, if adopted, cannot fail to lead man, in spite of 
his potential wickedness,  toward a better understanding and a closer 
co-operation with his fellowmen, and this co-operation in its turn, 
will hasten man's steps along the road of progress.3    Progress was a 
God in the eighteenth century. 
Presenting his project as a treaty ready for immediate acceptance 
by the nations of Europe, the Abbe Saint-Pierre sums up the reasons 
for such an organization in his General Conclusion: 
First.    Without the signature of the five articles establishing 
a European Diet, there is no hope of a general defensive league, 
and partial leagues may always lead to war. 
Second. Without a general league there can be no sufficient 
number of arbiters and no permanent s/stem of arbitration. 
Third.    Without a permanent system of arbitration to settle 
the differences which have arisen and will arise between two members 
of the league there can be no lasting alliance. 
Fourth. Without a general and lasting league, and without a 
permanent system of arbitration, there can be no security for the 
fulfillment of any promise, no lasting Peace. 
1. Ibid., p.   8£. 
2. Iblo"., p. 87. 
3. IBET., p. 92. 
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Fifth.  Without a permanent and General congress there 
can be no facilities for agreeing upon the articles necessary to 
reinforce and perfect the general defensive League, no decision 
upon any difference, no ruling in unforeseen cases. 
Sixth. Without a general and lasting defensive league there 
can be no hope of the cessation of the evils and cranes of v/ars 
civil and foreign, no hope of concord and tolerance between 
Christian Nations divided by Schism and Dogmas.1 
■■ I 
1.    Saint-Pierre,  o£. cit., p. 5>2. 
29 
The Treaty of Utrecht, 1713. 
The States System of Europe depends upon an equipoise, a balance 
of power, so adjusted that each State can keep what it already possesses, 
and that no one State or group of States shall be able to coerce and 
despoil the rest. In the absence of any super-state, of any interna- 
tional League or Society of Nations, this balance of power has neces- 
sarily been attended to and maintained by the members themselves who 
make up the States System. Normally each one can look after its own 
interests, and preserve its independence and its territory. 
This sensitive balance is always unstable; it is forever liable to 
be broken up by some state that takes upon itself to assault the system. 
This assault comes about either because a whole people waxes fat and 
arrogant, or because one or more persons within it become ambitiou3 of 
conquest, and form designs to extend their state by force. Since the 
Peace of Westphalia in 16U8 the states of Europe have enjoyed periods 
of equilibrium and therefore periods of peace, orrelative peacefulness, 
which, however, have been threatened or even destroyed by a Disturber. 
7ne appearance of such a Disturber (or of a Disturbing State) has, in 
turn always provoked the other states of Europe to band together to 
defend the system and check the aggressor. The end of each struggle 
has usually boen that the aggressor has been overcome, and that the 
European system has been re-established by some general peace settlement, 
some treaty on the grand scale, continuing with the modifications which 
the struggle made necessary, the settlement of Westphalia.1 looked at 
in this light, Louis XIV was a Disturber of the European System, sending 
his armies like battering rams against the structure reared by the 
1. ltowat, or>. cit., p. 18. 
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treaties of Westphalia and the Pyrenees. The assaults of Louis 
UV provoked coalitions of the assaulted states and of others who 
showed an interest isi the System. After a long series of wars, Louis 
was finally defeated, and the European States System was re-established 
at the Peace of Utrecht in 1713.* 
The background of the Peace of Utrecht lies in the activities 
of Louis XIV from 1660 until his death. The temptation to extend his 
authority, an impulse -,7hich grew stronger with the exercise of absolute 
power, lured him into a succession of costly wars which disturbed and 
alarmed all the European princes. The prestige and prosperity of 
France had awakened once more the fear of a dominant dynasty or nation, 
and the diplomats of the lesser European states were soon knitting 
alliances to check the ambitions of the Grand Monarch. 
Throughout Europe absolute monarchs followed the example set by 
Louis, regulating the political, economic, social, and cultural 
activities of the subjects, increasing their own power, prestige, and 
revenue as greatly as they could, aping the etiquette of Versailles, and 
imitating the Grand Monarch in his arbitrary temper and aggressive 
policies. The result, inevitably, was a series of conflicts, as the 
toughened and expanding states crowded one another for living room, 
raised tariffs against one another's trade, and incited the minority 
groups in neighboring countries to rebel, thereby confusing a rival's 
policies and depleting his power. 
The most costly campaigns in the series of seventeenth century 
wars arose from this ancient Bourbon-Hapsburg feud. Eager to extend 
his territory, Louis XT? adopted the doctrine of the "Natural frontiers" 
1. Ibid., p. 2U. 
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of France, affirming that Nature had provided, in the Rhine,  the 
Alps, and the Pyrenees,  the natural geographical Units of the Frendh 
kingdom.    To realize these frontiers,   Louis needed to annex Franche- 
Comte, Lorraine,  the Spanish Netherlands, and a portion of the Dutch 
Netherlands,  all but the last being territory nominally subject to the 
Austrian or Spanish Hapsburgs.1 
In 1665 when Charles II assumed the Spanish throne, Louis claimed 
the Spanish Netherlands on behalf of his wife, an elder half-sister of 
the Spanish monarch.     Louis based this claim on the droit de devolution 
under which his wife Marie Theresa as the child of the first marriage 
of the king of Spain had preference over children of the second 
marriage in the territorial settlement.    Also, Maria Theresa -eras the 
proper heir to such fiefs of Philip IV as were subject to the Jus 
devolutionis,  for the condition attached to her renunciation,  namely 
the payment of $00,000 crowns dowry* had never been fulfilled.2 
Louis received a disagreeable rebuff when England, Holland and 
Sweden formed a Triple Alliance in 1668 to check his advances.    He 
made peace by the Treaty of Aixla Chapelle signed on May 2, 1663 by the 
four countries involved.    France retained twelve fortified towns on the 
border of the Spanish Netherlands, but not the whole portion which it 
coveted.    The towns included Charleroi,  Binch, Athe, Douae, Fort de 
Scarpe, Tournai,  Oudenarde,   Lille, Armentieres, Courtrai, Bergue, and 
Furnes.3 
Angered at the Dutch who had thwarted his projects by their hardy 
diplomacy,  and envious of their commercial prosperity,   Louis bribed the 
venal English King Charles II to remain neutral (secret treaty of Dover, 
1. Bruun,  op. cit., pp. 300-302. 
2. R. B. MowatTT History of European Diplomacy LU51-1739,  (New York: 
Longmans,  Green and Jompany, lyzb), 1^6-127. " 
3. Ibid., p. 129. 
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l670),^   paid Sweden likewise to desert the Dutch, and then marched 
his troops into Lorraine and invaded Holland.    Once again he -was 
checked by the formation of an alliance.    The Emperor Leopold I, the 
Elector of Brandenburg,  Charles II of Spain and several German 
princes united to oppose French aggression.    Finally England, too, 
despite the efforts of Charles to keep the nation pro-French went over 
to the coalition. 
After six years of war (1672-1678),  Louis accepted the Peace of 
Himwegen, whereby Franche-Comte and some more fortified towns in what 
is now Belgium, passed under French control.    Hot Holland but Spain 
had paid for the war in lost territory.    France however, had paid 
also, in treasure,  in blood,  in lost trade, and in general unpopula- 
rity.2 
Louis XIV remained the Disturber of the European States System. 
His troops continued to occupy Lorraine and he manufactured pretexts 
for seising Strassburg in 1681 and Luxemburg in 168H as well as several 
lesser localities from the feeble control of the Emperor Leopold, who 
was threatened in these years by a Turkish advance on Vienna.     Louis' 
nibbling tactics, which constituted war -.vithout a declaration, 
precipitated a third conflict, the War of the League of Augsburg, 
lasting from 1689 to 1697.    A coalition of the Emperor, Spain, Holland, 
Sweden, Bavaria, and England outfought France on land and sea,  forcing 
Louis to abandon Lorraine and his claim to the Palantinate, and to 
restore all the territories seized since 1687 with the exception of 
Strassburg.    All this was accomplished by the Treaty of Eyswick, signed 
in 1697.3 
1. Bruun,  op. cit., p.  301. 
2. Ibid., p. 3077 
3. TDTCT., p. 303. 
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By this time it should have been clear to Louis that preponderant 
power, exercised aggressively in Europe by one state or dynesty, auto- 
matically called into existence an equal and opposite bloc to restore 
the international equilibrium, the necessary balance of power.    But 
the Grand Monarch would not contain himself.    In I698 a secret treaty 
for the partition of the dominions of Charles II, the dying and child- 
less King of Spain, was signed by France, England and Holland, by which 
the Electoral Prince of Bavaria was to have Spain,  the Indies,  the Low 
Countries and Sardinia;  the Dauphin was to have the two Sicilies, the 
Tuscan outposts, Finale and Guiposcoa, while the Archduke Charles Ml 
to have Milan.-1-    Hews of the treaty leaked out and Charles II so 
disliked the idea of partition that he signed a will appointing the 
young Electoral Prince of Bavaria his universal heir.    This arrange- 
ment pleased none of the states anxious to benefit by partition; the 
sudden death of the Electoral Prince three months later removed a 
source of diplomatic embarrassment.    Charles II who believed that the 
only hope for Catholicism and European peace lay in keeping together 
the Spanish Empire, was indignant that heretic nations, intent solely 
on trade, should profit by the proposed breaking up of a Catholic 
empire.    It was this sense of the dangers that might follow dismember- 
ment and a desire to retain the Spanish possessions as a great bulwark 
for Catholicism that induced Charles and the Spanish national party 
to consider the advisability of devising the whole inheritance to a 
Catholic prince who, while a member of a ruling house, would not be 
likely to succeed either to the Empire or to the throne of France.    The 
choice ultimately fell on Philip, Duke of Anjou, second grandson of 
1.    Ogg,  op_. cit., p. 261 
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Louis XIV, who was separated from the succession by the Dauphin and 
the Duke of Burgundy.    Before finally deciding, Charles consulted 
the Pope and obtained his approval in July of 17CO1.    On October 2,  1700 
Charles II signed the famous will by which he bequeathed the Spanish 
Enpire to Philip of Anjou.    It was stipulated that the Spanish 
inheritance should never be joined with the crown of France.    Translated, 
the will read: 
And ray intention being for the good of my subjects, of 
Christianity, and of all of Europe, this "onarchy be always 
separated from the crown of France, etc.2 
The publication of the will after the death of Charles II produced 
profound sensation throughout Europe.    In France opinion was at first 
divided whether to accept it or put into force the mo3t recent parti- 
tion, but Louis decided to seize the great heritage now within his 
grasp.    The Duke of Anjou was proclaimed king throughout the Spanish 
possessions as Philip V.    As the young man set out for his new realm 
Louis embraced him with the signifigant words:    "Adieu, mon filsj il 
n'y a plus de Pyrenees."3 
Although it is difficult to see how Louis could have avoided 
accepting the Spanish dominions,   it is possible to present one 
possible exit from this situation:    he might have appealed to a con- 
ference of western Europe,  and have made a concerted arrangement with 
all the states for a settlement of the Spanish succession.    When Louis 
accepted the will for his grandson, the resources of European diplomacy 
were exhausted.    If the French king really meant politically to abolish 
the Pyrenees, he was a grave disturber of the European States System. 
The balance of power would now be upset beyond repair.    The response 
1. Ibid., pp. 262-263. / , 
2. Charles Joseph Barthelemy Giraud, Le Traite d'Utrecht,  (Paris: 
Plon frlres, 18U7), 32. 
3. Ibid., p. 15. 
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•nas a new coalition, the Grand Alliance of the Hague, formed by- 
Austria, Holland, Brandenburg, England, and some smaller states, 
including the Duchy of Savoy, in 1701.1 
The main terns of the treaties that were signed at Utrecht in 
March 1713 between France and Great Britain, Holland, Portugal, 
Savoy and Prussia, all grouped together under, the name of the Peace 
of Utrecht vrore as follows: First, Philip V was recognized as King 
of Spain and the Indies on the condition that the crowns of France 
and Spain should never be united. Second, Naples, liLlan, Sardinia, 
and the Netherlands were given to the Emperor, subject to the right 
of the Dutch to the military government of Fumes, Ypres, Uenin, 
Ghent, Tournai, Hons, Charleroi, and Karaur as their barrier against 
France. Holland was given control over the closing of the Scheldt in 
order that the trade of Antwerp might not interfere with that of 
Amsterdam. Third, France was permitted to retain Alsace, including 
Strasburg as she had by the treaty of Ryswieh, but she had to surren- 
der the fortress of Kehl, Freisach and Freiburg, which she had seized 
on the right bank of the Rhine. Fourth, the electors of Koln and 
Bavaria were restored, the succession of the House of Hanover in 
England acknowledged, and the Chevalier banished from France. Fifth, 
England received Gibraltar, Minorca, Newfoundland (subject to certain 
rights of fishing on the banks), Hudson Bay, Acadia, and St. Kitts, 
and she acquired by an asiento, or agreement rath Spain the right to 
trade under strict limitations with certain towns in Spanish waters. 
Sixth, the kingdom of Prussia was recognized and received upper 
Guelderland. Seventh, Sicily and part of the Milanese were given to 
1. Bruun. op_. cit., p. 303- 
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the duke of Savoy and the fortifications of Dunkirk were abolished.1 
By this peace the rule of the Hapsburgs in Spain, which dated 
from the beginning of the sixteenth century,  came to an end.    Louis XIV 
had gained his end and the vri.ll of Charles II was confirmed.    The sole 
interest of France was in converting Spain from an enemy territory into 
a friendly one; the sole interest of Europe was to prevent forever the 
union of the crowns of France and Spain.2    The interests of Spain and 
France having already been determined, the treaty of Utrecht was in 
respect to the house of France what the treaty of Westphalia v/as for 
the house of Austria:    a limit.    But at the same time that it imposed 
on France a limit, the treaty gave her a right5 that was to have a 
friendly dynasty on the tlirone of Spain. 3 
The old monarchy of Spain, though it retained its possessions 
in the New World had to acquiesce in the French occupation of Franche- 
Conrte", and to surrender its Italian dominions and the Netherlands to 
the Hapsburgs in Austria.    Whether these acquisitions by Austria wore 
a fair equivalent for the loss of Alsace and for having had to relinquish 
Bavaria which she had held since the Battle of Blenheim in 170U, is 
questionable.    For their inhabitants did not speak her language; they 
lay at some distance from her true center of gravity, and served only 
to unfit her for the leadership of the Empire, and to distract her 
from the pursuit of German interests.    The Dutch Republic,  or the 
United Netherlands, secured the trade and control of the Scheldt, and 
obtained barrier fortresses against French aggression.    But she made 
no more fresh conquests from this time, and as her resources were 
1. W. 0. Wakeman, Europe, l$98-17lg»   (New York:    The UacUillan Co. 
1919), p. 36U. 
2. Giraud,  op. cit., p. 31* 
3. Ibid., pril9T" 
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being badly strained,   she ceased to be a first-rate power.    England 
■nas, no doubt, the chief gainer.    She had finally thrown off her 
Stuart kings, who had made her the paid adherent of France.    Gibraltar 
and Llinorca, with its harbour of Port Mahon,  formed a basis for her 
future naval supremacy in the Mediterranean; Newfoundland and her 
conquests on the mainland of North America for a future attack on 
Canada.    Although she had not won any very conspicuous successes at 
sea, yet she cane out of the war with valuable commercial privileges. 
The Duke of Savoy had gained Sicily and was left in the possession of 
Piedmont, which gave him a position of great importance in any future 
struggle between Hapsburg and Bourbon.1 
France herself,  chiefly owing to the dissensions of her enemies, 
escaped from the war on much better terns than she had any reason to 
expect.    Although repeated military defeats had so reduced her power 
that all chance of her dominating Europe was over, she lost nothing 
on the Continent which she had gained in the previous yrars of Louis' 
reign except a few towns on the east frontier.    She retained Artois 
and most of Flanders,  Valenciennes and Cambrai, Alsace and Franche- 
Comte/,  as well as Cerdagne and Itoussillon on the Spanish frontier. 
There are very important.    Her position in the Hew World was poten- 
tially magnificent.    She held Canada and the island of Cape Breton in 
the north,  Louisiana and many West Indian islands in the south, and if 
her military prestige had suffered in the War of the Spanish Succession, 
it had been partially restored by the last campaign of Villars.    Looking 
at the external results, the warlike policy of Louis XIV had met with 
brilliant results.2 
1. A. H. Johnson, The Age of the Enlightened Despot,  I66O-I789, 
(London:    E&Thuen JTCoTT WBT* bo-uo. 
2. Ibid., p. 5°. 
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The War of the Spanish Succession was fought,  say the critics 
of the Peace of Utrecht, to prevent the House of Bourbon from 
ascending the throne of Spain, and after eleven years of terrible 
bloodshed the Peace of Utrecht sanctioned the very connection between 
the crowns of France and Spain.    The weal: point in the peace—the 
danger from family compacts—has been much exaggerated.    But the 
cause was one over which the negotiators had little control.    The 
reostabliohment of the balance of power made the strengthening of the 
House of Austria necessary.    It was, thon, the inherent weakness of the 
Hapsburgs which made the balance established a tottering one.1 
Since the last great settlement of European affairs, the Peace 
of Westphalia, three great changes had occurred in European politics. 
France had acquired beyond all question the position of the leading 
nation of Europe.    A settlement which ignored this fact could not 
stand for ten years, and the allies showed their wisdom in permitting 
France to retain the position which she had legitimately won,  and 
guarding her against the abuse of it by forming states on her frontiers, 
powerful enough to keep her in check.    Events proved that they were 
right.    Austria and the Dutch in combination on the dangerous northern 
frontier, Prussia and the Empire on the east, Savoy to the southeast, 
with Austria in reserve in Italy, were as a matter of fact, found strong 
enough to contain the ambition of France in the eighteenth century.    It 
was not until the balance of power and the European states system alike 
irere swept away by the militant democracy of the Revolution, that France 
2 
became once more a menace to the liberties of Europe. 
1. Wakeman,   op. cit., p. 368. 
2. Ibid., P.-J66T 
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During the intervening period England had launched herself 
on that career of colonial and commercial ascendency which made her 
the most prosperous country in the world.    She was learning to 
found her colonial empire upon the settlement of colonies.    Her 
acknowledged superiority at sea might be questioned from time to 
time by France and Spain; however, it could never be overthrown 
and it brought with it the acquisition of French colonies and 
Spanish trading privileges.    The asiento was the thin end of the 
wedge by which England soon obtained the lion's share of the lucra- 
tive slave trade.    The cessions in North America were the beginning 
of her hold over the vast stretches of land to the north of her 
plantations, which were to be reduced wholly under her rule during 
the eighteenth century,  and are known as the Dominion of Canada and 
the Colony of British Columbia.    In securing to England power and 
privileges which she alone,  owing to her maritime supremacy,  could 
use properly, the Peace of Utrecht not only helped her forward on 
her true line of national development, but contributed in rfo slight 
degree to the resources and prosperity of the world at large.1 
And finally, the dismemberment of the Empire, which had been 
recognized and made permanent by the peace of Westphalia, had finally 
removed the last vestiges of national feeling and national policy in 
Germany.    The smaller German states grouped themselves for purposes 
of offense and defense naturally around the larger powers of the north 
and south—Prussia and Austria.    The barriers to French aggression on 
the Rhine had to be sought, not in bolstering up an effete institution 
like the Empire, out of which the vitality had long ago departed, but 
1.    Ibid.,  p. 366. 
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in strengthening and utilizing the leading national forces in 
these two powers. The Peace of Utrecht adopted this policy as far 
as was at that time possible. It planted Prussia as a sentinel 
over against France on the lower Rhine, and added to her possessions 
in that quarter as well as to her general dignity, in order to make 
her discharge her duties with the greater zeal. The subsquent history 
of Europe is one long commentary on the wisdom of this policy. This, 
then, is the inherent wealcness of the balance of power system. One 
state is artificially increased to combat the strength of another country} 
it is entirely possible that the former will live to become the threat 
to the general welfare. There is no guarantee that a strengthened state 
will serve its purpose and not aspire to a position of dominance. 
Austria required no incentive to fulfil a similar task in the 
upper Rhine and in Italy, but she vras deficient in the necessary 
resources. In the War of the Spanish Succession, the gold and armies 
of England alone had saved Austria. By giving to her the richest part 
of Italy, and defending her from French attack by the buffer state of 
Savoy, the peace did all that was possible to strengthen the defenses 
of Europe against a renewal of French tyranny, while ministering to the 
dynastic ambition of the house of Hapsburg. 
In its main lines, the treaty of Utrecht was a modification of 
Westphalia, and lite the earlier treaty mainly registered and sanctioned 
accomplished facts.-1- Both treaties gave concrete expression to the 
doctrine that states can be transferred like chattels without reference 
to the opinion of the inhabitants. The negotiators were untroubled by 
the fact that Italy, Germany, and Belgium still remained geographical 
1. Ibid., p. 365-367. 
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expressions, and seem to have assumed that by partition of the 
Spanish empire between the claimants the balance of power was 
restored and the peace of Europe was once more established. 
Though based on nothing higher than the conventional diplomatic 
traditions, the balance of power of the Ancien Regime, the treaty 
of Utrecht was not without its advantages. It averted the menace of 
a Bourbon Empire. Indirectly it benefited Spain, because it removed 
from her control European territories that had involved commitments 
far beyond her military or financial resources, and vihen the Pyrenees 
became the real frontier of Spain, she -.vas able to devote her 
revenues to national needs rather than to European ambition. 
The treaty of Utrecht looked to the future rather than to the 
past. Savoy benefits materially and becomes the strongest independent 
power in Italy, while the destinies of Germany are placed in the eager 
liands of Prussia. The decline of Holland as a European and colonial 
power is foreshadowed, and Great Britain stands out as the great 
maritime power of the future. The acquisition of Newfoundland and 
Acadia was to be the beginning of the struggle for suprermcy in North 
America; while the possession of Gibraltar was one of the most imortant 
links of the future British Empire. Colonial rivalry now displaces 
dynastic ambition in the chancellories of Europe, and the young, 
vigorous states such as Prussia break down the old monopoly which had 
confined hegemony to a few families.1 
Even in the middle of the nineteenth century the dependence of 
the states system on the treaty of Utrecht was recognized by Giraud: 
1. Ogg, op_. cit., pp. 277-279. 
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Since 1713 the increase of the power of Britain, 
the weakening of the power of Holland, the enlargement 
of Prussia, the extension of Russian domination, the 
diminishing of the power of Sweden, the emancipation of 
the large American colonies, and the establishment 
of representative monarchies, have changed the elements 
of the balance, but the principles have kept the same, 
and one is able to say that the lav; of nations of middle 
Europe rests yet on the foundations laid at Utrecht. •*■ 
1. Giraud, op, cit», p. 12. 
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Eighteenth Century Background 
From the Peace of Utrecht to the French Revolution, a quieter 
and more settled era stretched its lengthening spell over the strife- 
racked continent. Fanaticism was discredited. A more tolerant, 
judicious, and even skeptical attitude developed, and religious issues 
no longer provoked men to violence and bloodshed. If not genuine 
tolerance, at least a live-and-let-live spirit replaced the lust to 
silence all dissident opinion. Eighteenth century society, especially 
in France, Holland, and England was distinguished by its moderation 
and civility, by elegance and amiability, by a dislike of all extrava- 
gant appeals to passion, prejudice, irrationality, or violence. Not 
since the Roman peace of the first century of the Christian era had 
Europe known so long a period of relative freedom from major disorders 
or disasters.1 
The French writer, Sorol, gives quite a different picture as he 
speaks of eighteenth century politics and methods: 
To sun up, there is no other guarantee except self-interest, of 
course, and no other principle of order except the opposition 
of these interests. Custom reverts to these maxims of empire! 
What is good to take is good to keep, says passion, and everyone 
gives heed. Prudence replies, there is good in talcing only what 
is good to keep, and very few follow her counsel. Ambition says, 
we must extend ourselves; let us calculate with the strong, and 
let us divide if they demand itj the important thing is to regu- 
late the conditions of bargain. It is better, answers Wisdom, 
to rule in the midst of divided inferiors than to dispute the 
empire with powerful rivals. You do well, concludes Experience, 
to undertake only what you are capable of finishing. This calcu- 
lation is the only safeguard of states against their own ambitions 
and against the excesses of others.2 
Spain, Portugal, Austria, and the Italian states made but slow 
progress during the eighteenth century. In the Germanies, Prussia 
doubled in size and population, while farther east Russia continued to 
1. Bruun,   op,  cit., p. 369. y .        ___ ' 
2. Albert SoreTTTL'Eurone et la Revolution Francaisc,   Iga Loeurs 
Politiques et les TraHItions,   (,raris:    Ebrairie Plon,   l^s 
Petits-!t'ils~a!e'TIon et Nourrit, 1835), I, 35. 
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expand in area and to increase in population despite backward 
social and economic institutions.    The most important single event 
in Eastern Europe in the eighteenth century was the disappearance 
of Poland, partitioned among Prussia,  Russia and Austria between 
1772 and 1795.1 
Throughout this period the fact that Louis XIV's ambition to 
extend the boundaries of France beyond reasonable limits, and to 
dominate Spain by linking it to France in a dynastic alliance, had 
been seriously thwarted, was evidence in itself that the states 
system of Europe possessed a rectifying quality; a preponderant 
assumption of power by one state had once again called forth the 
united efforts of the remaining states and the attempt at domination 
had been defeated.2 This international balance of power, though it 
shifted and oscillated, was to vindicate itself as the dominant 
principle of European politics. 
1. Bruun, op. cit., p. 365* 
2. Ibid., pT 37HT 
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Zum ewigen Frieden by Immanuel Kant    1795 
In 1793 England began her great war with France, which was 
already involved with Austria and Prussia.    In 1795 the Peace of 
Basel terminated for a tine the struggle between Prussia and France. 
The philosopher Immanuel Kant was doubtless influenced by the 
treaty concluded at Basel, just as the Abbe Saint-Pierre was moved 
by the Congress of Utrecht to formulate his peace project.    The 
plans of Kant and Saint-Pierre were both in the form of treaties, 
ready for the signatures of the nations.    "In fact, from a biblio- 
graphical standpoint,  Kant's little work holds place along with 
Sully's Meraoires and Sainte-Pierre's Project,"^ as interest in the 
philosopher and his work has grown through the years. 
The plan proposed by the philosopher was based on the same idea 
as that held successively by Saint-Pierre, Perm, Rousseau, and 
Bentham—a general confederation of European states.    The preliminary 
articles provided:    first, that no secret reservations were to be 
included in treaties;  second, that no independent state was to be 
acquired by another; third, that standing armies were to be abolished; 
fourth,  that no national debts were to be contracted for the external 
affairs of the state; fifth, that no state was to interfere with 
another state; sixth,  that no state at war was to commit such acts of 
hostility as would render future confidence impossible. 
The second section of Kant's essay contains the three definite 
articles of a perpetual peace with a running commentary for each: 
1.    Hemleben,  op. cit., p. 88. 
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First, the civil constitution of each state was to be republican.1 
Kant believed that perpetual peace was to be achieved only under 
a republican constitution since under such a constitution the consent 
of the subjects was needed to go to war. Otherwise, the decision of 
war would be left to the whin of the ruler. Republicanism is defined 
as the "Political principle of severing the executive power of the 
government from the Legislature",2 despotism is that "Principle in 
pursuance of which the state arbitrarily puts into effect laws which 
it has itself made",3 and democracy "In the proper sense of the word, 
is of necessity despotism, because it establishes an executive power.. 
..Therefore the whole people, so-called, who carry their measures are 
really not all, but only a majority: so that the universal will is 
in contradiction with itself and with the principle of freedom... "^ 
The second definite article of perpetual peace says that the law 
of nations shall be founded on a federation of free states.§ Kant 
•m 
believed that peace was to be achieved only if states resolved to give 
up their lawless freedom and yield to the coercion of public laws. 
He proposed that the states "Can form a State of Nation, one, too, 
which will be ever-increating and would finally embrace all the 
peoples of the earth.."" He realized the impossibility of establish- 
ing a world republic and proposed a negative substitute for it, a federa- 
tion averting war, maintaining its ground and ever extending all over the 
world. 
1. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, a Philosophical Essay, 
Campbell Smith, lllew York: The BaBflulaE Company, 
2. Ibid., p. 125. 
3. Ibid. 
h. TEH. 
5. TBI3., p. 128. 
6. TBia!., p. 128-137. 
trans II. 
1?17), 120. 
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The third article said that the rights of men, as citizens of 
the world, were to be limited to the conditions of universal hospitality.! 
Here Kant shews that the relation of the federated states to one another 
and to the v/hole was to be determined by cosmopolitan law. 
Kant did not think that immediate peace was possible.    That is why 
he analyzed the causes of war,  for he was convinced that permanent peace 
was not attainable without sufficient preparation.    This was then the 
construction of an international system on a philosophical basis.    The 
basis he finds in the development of enlightened self-interest among the 
people and the growth of the moral idea, which had already made men open 
to the influence of the mere conception of law, as though this is itself 
possessed physical power.2    Perpetual peace will thus ultimately be 
guaranteed by nature itself through the mechanism inherent in human 
inclination. 
Kant's plan was less detailed than Henry's or Saint-Pierre's.    The 
German philosopher failed to work out in detail the idea of a congress 
applying the principles of international law, and he failed to suggest 
an international court to administer the law of nations.    His union of 
states was not an indissoluble onej and he guarded himself, as if 'oy 
anticipation, against the imputations of desiring to establish a 
universal state.     Kant explicitly said: 
Thi3 alliance does not tend to any dominion over a state, 
but solely to the certain maintenance of the liberty of each 
particular state, partaking of this association, without being 
therefore obliged to submit,  like men in a state of nature to 
the legal constraint of public force.3 
Kant demanded the abolition of standing armies; but he did not 
discuss conscription,   a development at that time yet unforeseen.    He 
1. Ibid., p, I38. 
2. raZlips, 00.  cit.,  pp. 23-29. 
3. Ibid., p. pf. 
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insisted that no national debts were to be contracted for the 
external affairs of the state.    It is surprising to find Kant empha- 
sizing national indebtedness at a time when the international credit 
system was still in its infancy.1   The essay "by Kant was particularly 
unusual in that it was a direct attack on the imperialism that   was to 
develop in the next century.    Kant held that the rights of men in 
foreign countries should be limited to the privileges accorded by 
hospitality.    The proposal that all states have republican government 
appeared quite radical at the time, for, with the exception of England 
and France after the Revolution, every European country was ruled by 
a despot.    Kant was anxious to have constitutional government established 
in all states,  for,  he assumed, the consent of the people would be 
necessary to go to war.    He was convinced that the people would not 
decide on war so lightly as princes would.2 
1. Ibid. 
2. Tbla\, p. 95. 
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Nineteenth Century Background 
The rampart of republics erected beyond the French borders 
as a consequence of the victories of 179U to 1800, and the expansion 
of French influence in Europe, upset the balance of power, but 
Napoleon as the Great Disturber of the European states system was 
not prepared to renounce the advantage that he had won.    The French 
pride demanded that the regimes set up in Belgium, Switzerland, and 
Italy should be kept under French protection.    At last the "natural 
frontiers," the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, had been not 
merely reached but transcended,   and French revolutionists, happy at 
this "natural" solution to an ancient problem, hailed this aggrandiz- 
ment.    To other European governments, however, this revival of French 
aggression recalled the ambitions of Louis XIV.    France once more 
threatened the system of equilibrium.    And, as in the time of Louis 
XIV, the preponderance of France called into existence successive 
coalitions to counteract it, and all Napoleon"s interval of power 
was an effort to maintain by new campaigns, an artificial and unstable 
ascendancy.-'- 
■While the remaining monarchs of Europe leagued themselves 
together against the "regicide republic", the French repelled the 
invading armies and took the offensive in a war against all kings. 
Victory and the spread of revolutionary influences enabled the French 
to erect this rampart of republics around the frontiers of France.    But 
the French bourgeoisie, alarmed at the egalitarian demands of the people, 
called on the republican army to repress popular disorders,  and after 
1795 the French Revolution retrograded.    Judged by its ideal program the 
Revolution had been called a supreme assault of the human spirit against 
1.    Bruun,  op_.  cit., pp. I;36-U37. 
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the forces of indestructible brute fact. 
The efficient and highly centralized administration erected by 
Napoleon after 1799 resembled much more closely the unified despotism 
of the Ancien Regime than it did the ideal republic prophesied by the 
reformers.    Napoleon's attempts to hold and extend gains achieved in 
Italy,  in the Rhineland, and in Belgium involved him in wars against 
successive European coalitions.    The First Coalition was formed in 
1792 and lasted until 1797;  it included Prussia, Austria, Spain, 
Holland and Britain.    The Second Coalition, 1798-1800, was a triple 
affair involving Britain, Austria and Russia.    The Third Coalition, 
composed of Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia lasted from 180$ to 
1807.    And the Fourth Coalition formed in 1812 and lasting until the 
abdication of Napoleon in l8lU, included Britain, Spain, Russia, 
Prussia, Austria and Sweden.1    Thus most of Europe concerned itself 
with the balance of power and the preservation of the equilibrium 
enough to take up arms against the Disturber State and its dictator 
during some part of this twenty-year period. 
1.    Ibid., pp. H21-U22. 
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Instructions to Novosiltzov 180U 
In 100b Tsar Alexander was still in the first flush of his 
liberalism.    He wished to apply the ideas he had learnt from his 
Swiss tutor,   La Harpe, to a new crusade on behalf of Europe, to whose 
assistance his father, the "mad" Paul, had already sent Russian troops 
as far as Italy and Switzerland,  a 'new phenomenon in the balance of 
European power.    The young Pole, Adan Czartoryski, full of ambition 
and love of country,  and anxious to use his new position to serve both, 
v/as now in charge of foreign affairs, and he and a group of young 
Russians encouraged the Tsar in these schemes. 1   An understanding for 
common defense had already been made with Austria.    But British gold   ' 
DBS needed to bring a coalition into being,  and at the end of October 
130U, the young Count Novosiltzov v/as sent by the Tsar and Czartoryski 
to London on a special mission. 
Novosiltzov"s Instructions breathed a spirit of lofty idealism in 
vjhich, however, the objects of the Tsar and his Foreign J.Iinister found 
an appropriate expression.    The old Europe was gone forever and in its 
place a new structure must rise.    The new Europe must take into account 
the spirit of the times.    Nationality,  constitutionalism,  and federa- 
tion were the main features of the Instructions.2    The old feudalism 
nust be replaced by liberal governments,  founded on the sacred right 
of humanity.    All monarchs must endow their subjects with modern consti- 
tutions.    Even the Ottoman Empire must be encouraged to reform itself, 
if by joining France it did not lay itself open to more drastic 
1. C.  K. 7/ebster,  The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh,  1812-lSlgj Britain 
and the Reconstruction of Eurone,   {London: G. Bell and Sons, 
-mryrvu  
2. Hans George Schenk, The Aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars,   (New York: 
Oxford University Press, l^h'fJT 277 
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treatment. 1    France herself nust not be made an exception for it was 
not the French people but Napoleon who ■was responsible for the diffi- 
culties of Europe.    In fact, the foundation on which the Uovosiltzov 
Instructions were based was the conviction that the main ideas of the 
French Revolution were sound. 2 
The system which should bind together the Various member states 
of the European league was to be a new, clearly defined, codified 
international law,  to which the national law of the member states would 
be subjected.3    in this way the European league was to interfere in 
constitutional questions affecting its members j for it is highly pro- 
bable that the "tranquility and safety" that this organization would 
guarantee did not mean external peace alone.'1    like Saint-Pierre, the 
solution for war was to be mediation.    Any state that defied the new 
Europe might be expected to bring upon itself immediately a coalition 
of all the others, but the privileges of neutrality should also be 
assured, and this point led naturally to the hope that Britain's concep- 
tion of maritime rights was to be raodified.5 
There is the proposal that Great Britain join Russia in the 
establishment of a new European order which amounted to a recognition 
of the principle of self-determination of nations:    "The character of 
of the national desires must be considered before deciding upon the 
form of the government to be established."0    In the sane vein the 
1. Yfcbster,   op_. cit., p. $h» 
2. Schenk,  op. cit.,  p. 28. 
3. Ibid., p.  30. 
U.   1533., p. 31. 
5. Harold Uicolson, The Con-ress of Vienna; A Study In Allied Unity, 
1812-1822,   (TTew York:    Harcourt, Brace and Company,  19hb),  $k» 
6. Andrei A.   Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe 1789-182$,   (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1?UYJ,  ou» 
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Allies were to fight, not the French people, but "a government as 
tyrannical towards France as towards the rest of Europe."1 
As for a durable and final peace,  it would be possible only if 
Europe were organized into a confederacy by a pact to which the 
nations would voluntarily adhere and which would become "the basis 
of the reciprocal relations between the states of Europe."2    This 
league would have to establish natural frontiers as boundaries and 
guarantee a homogeneous population to each of the states.    As for the 
snail states, in the name of the balance of paver they should either 
unite with the larger states or group themselves into small federative 
unions, for the "disturbances which have shaken Europe....have only 
taken place because so little attention has been paid to the system of 
equilibrium. "3 
Finally, Britain and Russia must take the new Europe under their 
special protection as the only Powers ""Who by their position are 
invariably interested in the reign there of order and justice, the only 
ones who by their position can maintain it, and being free from con- 
flicting desires and interests will never trouble this happy tranquillity."1* 
Some concrete suggestions were included.    The King of Sardinia should 
be restored to Piedmont,  if he would grant a constitution to his subjects. 
The Italian republics should be rescued from French control.    Switzerland's 
independence should be re-established,   and she should be enlarged and 
endowed with a democratic constitution.    Holland should also be rescued 
from French influence and placed under a Stadtholder, who, of course, 
must be a constitutional ruler.    As for the German states, they would be 
united into a federation from which Prussia and Austria were excluded, 
1. Ibid., p. 81. 
2. TEIa". 
. Ibid.,  p. 82. 
. Webster,   op. cit., p. £$• I 
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thus making a balance between the tiro.1   One of the features of 
the liovosiltzov Instructions -was the neglect of Prussia and Austria. 
The Instructions illustrate the mingling of sentimentality and 
statecraftj  of opinion and ambition, which accounts for the strange 
oscillations of Russian policy between altruistic philosophy and 
brutal self-seeking.2    Alexander insisted on the need of tearing from 
France the mask of liberty v.hich she had so long vrorn so profitably. 
Against the naturalism of Rousseau, which supplisd Napoleon with 
excellent reasons for every annexation, Alexander resolved to appeal 
to historical rights and the balance of po.ver.    Yet he also resolved 
to uphold the claims of legitimacy and liberty.^    The Novosiltziv 
Instructions owed everything to Western Enlightenment,  and interest- 
ingly enough they laid no stress on the Christain character of the 
federation.k 
And so the Ituscovite T/ho had been excluded from membership in 
the proposed federations of Sully and Abbe Saint-Pierre on the grounds 
of religion,  now presented to the western nations his own plan for a 
European federation.    This has its own significance in the history of 
modern times. 
With the aims of the liovosiltzov Instructions, Pitt declared his 
entire concurrence; a just and lasting peace being the first of British 
interests.    He developed these notions in a remarkable document of the 
19th of January 1805.    He agreed entirely with the Tsar that it would 
be necessary to reduce France to her former limits, to liberate conquered 
1. Ibid. 
2. John Holland Rose, The life of William Pitt,   (London:    G.  Bell and 
and Sons,  193U7T"lTr5277 
3. Ibid., 523. 
'-.    ScEenk,   oj3. cit.,  p. 23. 
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territory, to create future barriers against French aggression,  to 
form some system of collective security, and to re-establish the 
public law of Europe.1   However, Pitt did not agree with the Tsar in 
thinking that the rights and interests of Prussia or Austria could 
be ignored; without their assistance the total defeat of Uapoleon 
weald have been impossible.    Thus, while Pitt felt that in any case 
Holland should be liberated and enlarged,  so as to include Antwerp 
and to form the necessary barrier to France, he was not of the opinion 
that the Italian Republics could, after so long a period of subjugation, 
be usefully accorded independence.    Such areas, together with Belgian 
and Luxemburg territory, should preferably be used as compensations and 
rewards to make Austria and Prussia join the proposed Coalition. 
Prussia,  in other Trords,  should be encouraged to expand north and vrest, 
provided only that 3he did not encroach on Hanover, whereas Austria 
should be encouraged to seek compensations in the south.    The elimina- 
tion of Bonaparte should not be the avowed purpose of the new Coalition, 
but would be welcomed if the French themselves desired it.    In return 
for agreement on these points, Great Britain would be ready to place 
into the common pool many of the colonial conquests which she had made 
at the expense of France and her satellites.    And finally a general 
guarantee of their European possessions should be accorded to all the 
partners of the new Coalition.2 
At the time these proposals, both the Russian and the British, 
were rendered inoperative owing to the battle of Austerlitz and the 
■ 
new course adopted by Alexander after Tilsit.3 Pitt also assented to 
1. Nicolson, op. pit., p. $$ 
2. Ibid. 
3. Schenk, on. cit., p. 29• 
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the Tsar's proposal that the final settlement should be guaranteed 
by international agreements forming a basis for the new European 
polity, a suggestion in which lies the germ of the Holy Alliance.1 
1.    Rose, op_.  cit., p. 523. 
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Congress of Vienna l8lg 
The Congress of Vienna had to restore order and stability to 
Europe after a quarter of a century of revolution and war.    The 
solutions adopted disappointed almost all classes, but the settlement 
did bequeath to Europe a period of forty years without an amed clash 
anong any of the great powers.    If the function of a peace conference is 
to prepare an enduring peace, the Congress of Vienna was one of the most 
successful in history. 
Vienna was chosen as the meeting place of the Congress in l8lU, by 
virtue of its position as the capital of one of the successful bellige- 
rents, and a seat of a government which in a special sense represented 
law, order, and established tradition.    There are two outstanding points 
of the Congress of Vienna.    In the first place, it was not a "Peace 
Conference", because peace had already been made at Paris, and all the 
questions at issue between France and the Allies had been definitely 
settled.    The state of war had ceased both in fact and in lav;, and 
France, when the Congress of Vienna met,  could claim to associate with 
the other powers as a regular member of the European states system. 2 
The second outstanding point is that the Congress of Vienna did not 
meet to make a new world out of the oldj they believed that the old 
European system had satisfied the needs of mankind, both for law and 
for liberty; and so they meant net,to reconstruct a new system, but to 
restore the old.3 
Terms were formulated to meet four aims in particular:    First, 
to restore the balance of power in Europe; second, to "contain" France 
so that she should not ovorwhelm her weaker neighbors again; third, to 
1. Ibid., p. 500. 
2. Ilowat, History of European Diplomacy, p. U. 
3. Ibid., p. 5. 
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organize stable and legitimate governments in regions liberated 
from revolutionary, provisory or military regimes; and fourth,  to 
compensate the victor pavers for the sacrifices which they had made.1 
The solution was similar to the one made at Utrecht a century 
previous.2    The Quadruple Alliance was considered the instrument of 
correction in regard to the balance of power in Europe.    This alliance 
was to arrange conferences from time to time to resolve new difficul- 
ties as they arose.    At the Congress of Vienna, Belgium and Holland 
were united as the Kingdom of the Netherlands.    This was the creation 
of a potential buffer state against any future French designs in the 
north.    Prussia was strengthened and given territory in Western 
Germany so that she might maintain the necessary "watch on the Rhine." 
The Austrian Empire—not to be confused with the Holy Roman Empire— 
vras rehabilitated after Napoleon's crushing blows and given control 
of Lombardy and the territory of the Venetian Republic.    As republics 
were no longer in fashion,  Genoa passed out of separate existence and 
was incorporated into the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia under the House 
of Savoy,  thus creating a stronger state in northern Italy to guard 
the mountain passes from France.3 
Great Britain retained lialta, Helgoland, and Capetown,  and the 
islands of Tobago and Saint Iucia in the West Indies, and Mauritius 
in the Indian Ocean.    Denmark lost Norway, which was annexed to Sweden. 
Russia retained Finland which she had conquered in 1809.    Poland vras 
once more divided among the three eastern powers, Prussia, Austria, and 
Russia; the latter power received the largest share which it erected 
into a kingdom with Tsar Alexander I as king.*1 [ 
1. Bruun,   op. cit., p. £00. 
2. Ibid., p. 5oTTT 
3. IEEE., p. $<£. 
U. TEEcf. 
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France, the defeated nation, came off lightly, preserving 
the foundries of 1791. But the Bourbons were substituted for the 
Bonapartes, and Louis XVIII, brother of the guillotined Louis XVI, 
was restored as the legitimate monarch. France had partially for- 
gotten its grievances against Bourbonism because of the greater 
hardships inflicted by Bonapartism. Louis XVIII promised to reign 
as a constitutional monarch and, to fulfil his pledge, he issued 
the charter of l8llu This constitution reflected soner/hat the 
changes that had transpired in France since 1789.1 It was prefaced 
by a declaration of the rights of man and the citizen, closely 
modeled upon the historic platform of 1709. Full executive 
authority including the appointment of the ministry was reserved 
to the king. A legislature of two houses was to be so selected 
that control would largely rest in the hands of the plutocratic 
landed gentry. Tihile the deputies were to be chosen by men who 
paid at least three hundred francs in direct taxes, the upper house 
was to be appointed by the monarch. By its assertion of the inviola- 
bility of property, the Charter confirmed the land settlements 
effected during the Revolution." 
After a year French dissatisfaction over these terms, and 
hostility to the returning exiles, enabled llapoleon to make one more 
bid for power. But his dramatic escape from his island kingdom of 
Elba, where he load been exiled, was accompanied by only a hundred 
day reign. Liberal decrees issued by liapoleon, assured the people 
of rights denied them under the Empire, supplemented by masterly 
• '! 
1. Authus May, The Age of lletternich, 181U-18U8,   (Hew York*    Henry 
Holt aricTCompany, 1933h &-?• " 
2. Ibid., p.  8. 
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patriotic appeals, captured the imagination of nearly all of 
Prance.1   His brief second reign ended in irretrievable defeat at 
Waterloo in June, l8l£.    This time he was exiled to distant Saint 
Helena for the last six years of his life, and Europe settled dovm 
to sullen peace and economic distress of the sort that follows all 
great wars,2 
Maddened by the response France had made to Napoleon's appeals, 
the Allies imposed upon France a Second Treaty of Paris whose terns 
were far more drastic than those of its predecessor.    It was the 
whole French nation,  not the army alone,  that had rallied to the 
Emperor in the Hundred Days; hence there was justification for a 
harsher policy and for the exaction of solid guarantees for the 
future.^ The French frontier was pushed back to the limits of 1790, 
involving a loss  of a half million people in the Saar Valley. 
Ifetternich and Alexander stood firm with Castlereagh in preventing 
Prussia from taking Alsace-Lorraine in the Second Peace of Paris.• 
France was obliged to pay an indemnity of 700,000,000 francs within 
five years,  and to maintain an Allied army of occupation in the 
principal frontier fortresses until the debt was paid.    All of the 
stolen works of art were ordered returned to their rightful owners.5 
A week before Waterloo, the powers had completed their negotiations 
at Vienna and signed the "Final Act."    Compromises had of necessity 
been made.    In arriving at decisions regarding territory, the diplomats 
had been guided mainly by the war-time secret treaties, partly by the 
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determination to erect a strong barrier system around Prance,  and 
partly by the principles of legitimacy and compensation.1 
Among the principal territorial and dynastic changes,  aside 
from France, vrere the following:    Some of the loyal German princes 
recovered their titles and possessions, but the claims of several 
hundred petty ecclesiastical andcity states were ignored.    No effort 
was made to revive the Holy Roman Empire which had been dissolved 
by Napoleon.    A new Germanic confederation of 38 states was created 
under a constitution which provided for a diet of delegates or 
representatives of the rulers and gave Austria the presidency.    The 
extent of the territorial enlargement of Prussia and Austria has been 
noted earlier. 
The Bourbons were restored in Naples; the Papal States vrere returned 
to the Pope; and the king of Piedmont recovered his throne. As compensa- 
tion for the loss of Belgium, the rest of Italy was left under either 
direct or indirect rule of Austria. 
Sweden mi forced to cede Finland formally to Russia and western 
Pomerania to Germany, but as compensation, she received Norway from 
Denmark, because of the latter's friendship for Napoleon. 
The shameful dismemberment of Poland was legalized on the ground 
of legitimacy.    The lion's share,  including Warsaw, went to Russia; 
Posen,  Thorn and Danzig went to Prussia; Austria received Galicia; and 
Cracow became a free state.2 
Of course the Bourbon House was restored in Spain.    The slave trade 
was abolished,  but the enforcement of the act was left to each state. 
A code of International Law to regulate the navigation of European 
1. Ibid., p. 15. 
2. Alexander Clarence Flick, Modern World History,  1776-1926,     (New 
York:    F. S. Crofts Company, W<Lt>), 132-I3U. 
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rivers and the methods of international diplomacy was drawn up.l 
Thus,  the aristocratic Congress ignored the new forces of 
liberalism and nationalism, -which had been born in Europe.    A few 
rulers and their ministers had remade the map of Europe, trading 
off people as if they were still serfs.    The patriotic feelings of 
the Belgians, Norwegians, Finns,  Polos, Germans, and Italians were 
outraged by the enforcement of the practices of the eighteenth century 
despots.    Even the doctrine of legitimacy was not rigidly adhered to, 
for Bernadotte, the Napoleonic marshal, heir to the throne of Sweden, 
was not de3posed because he had deserted his master and been faithful 
to the cause of the Allies.2 
It is said that every ruler left Vienna dissatisfied.    All over 
Europe people were grumbling at the short-sighted settlements.    Even 
the old general, Blucher, denounced the Congress as "An annual cattle 
fair."3    Excepting Holland, only the great powers gained in population 
and land.    Europe was filled with sore spots for the future.    The 
doctrine of legitimacy was to be applied to religion,  education, 
science, philosophy and literature.'1 
Against these blunders of the Congress, must be placed sane 
positive gains.    In the first place, Europe was given some years of 
badly needed peacd.    Secondly, the settlement of the affairs of the 
continent in one document,  signed by all the states, meant progress 
in international relations.5    Diplomats no-.-r realised that they could 
meet together and arrive at a solution of their common problems.    This 
1. Ibid. 
2. Brunn,  op_. cit., p. f>06. 
3. Flick, pp. cit., p. 13U. 
U. Ibid., p.  1337 
5. IBIS. 
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was then the material realization of the progress of the evolution 
of the European states system from its crude beginnings at the 
Congress of Westphlia, through the intermediary step of the Congress 
of Utrecht, and finally to the acceptance of the Concert principle 
by the Congress of Vienna.    Finally, it 7/as some positive gain to 
have people imbued rath the hope of an all embracing reform of the 
political system of Europe.     "The ground has been prepared," v/rote 
the official secretary Gentz, "for building up a bettor social 
structure."1 
Such v/as the most important international settlement bctv/een 
that of 16U8 at Y/estphalia and that of 1919 at Paris.    It vra.s the 
fashion of the nineteenth century liberal historians to denounce the 
discisions of the Congress of Vienna.^    Since 1919> hovrever,  and 
especially sinco the hectic days after 19U5>> it has become clear 
that the diplomats called together at the close of a general 
European vrar are so bound by earlier agreements and by the exigencies 
of the moment that they cannot build the Utopia.    They are fortunate 
if they are able even to reconstruct an old order.    In 1815 neither 
the statesmen nor the peoples of Europe had any thorough understanding 
of tho vague principles of nationality and democracy.    Lloreover, there 
v;as, at the time of the Vienna Congress, a vriclespread distrast of 
these revolutionary concepts.    It is as incredible that the statesmen 
of 1815 would have made them the basis of a reconstructed Europe as 
the delegates at the conferences of 1919 or 19U5 should have revamped 
Europe in accordance with the precepts of Communism.    After the over- 
throw of Napoleon the diplomats quite naturally resorted to the 
familiar ideas of the balance of power and to the notions of legitimacy, 
1. Ibid. 
2. Artz,  op. cit., p. 116. 
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and tried to fuse them into some sort of compromise that would 
guarantee Europe a period of peace.    Whatever may be said against 
the diplomats,  they vrere, most of them, reasonable,  fair-minded, and 
rrell-intentioned.    These qualities T/ere most strikingly revealed in 
their treatment of France and in the general absence of rancor in 
their decisions.1 
1.    Ibid., pp. 115-H6 
6* 
Holy Alliance proposed by Tsar Alexander I of Russia 
The Holy Alliance with its background of pietism and mysticism, 
T.lth its debatable authorship—some attributing it to Alexander, 
others to the Baroness von Krudener—had its acknowledged origin,   so 
the Tsar said,  in the scheme of guarantee -which Castlereagh had 
proposed at Vienna.1    Castloreagh had seen the idea of diplomacy by 
conference,  which he took -.vith him on his first journey to the Conti- 
nent, justified again and again in the co-arse of the following years.2 
But the Holy Alliance, translated into the mystical terms of Tsar 
Alexander's current attitude, had assumed a shape as different from 
Castlereagh«s conception as possible.    To the Tsar must be attributed 
the tone of mystic pietism in v/hich the document was drafted; to him 
above all must be attributed the fatal error of concluding the Holy 
Alliance in the name of the sovereigns personally, and not in the 
name of their governments or peoples.3 
How at this propitious time Alexander perhaps felt called by 
Providence to carry out the great plan of King Henry IV, whose Grand 
Design, as well as the Peace Project of the Abbe''Saint-Pierre, was 
familiar to hia.**    The Tsar felt that the great Christian principles 
of peace and mutual good will,  solemnly avowed by all the European 
nonarchs, would provide the basis for the administration of their 
respective states.*    The reciprocal relations of the powers were 
henceforth to be based "Upon the sublime truths which the holy 
reliCion of our Savior teaches."6    The Ho2y miMce stipulated that 
"The precepts of Justice,  Christian Charity and peace...must have an 
51 HI 
1. Webster,   op. cit., p. U80. 
2. ibid., p. ufta, 
U. Ilemleoen, pp.  clT., p. 97. 
5. Ibid., p. Jo",   
6.    TaxTl IPS,   0£.   cit.,   p.   305. 
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immediate influence on the councils of Princes, and guide all their 
steps", and that monarchs would, accordingly, "Remain united by the 
bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity and considering each 
other as fellow countrymen, they will on all occasions and in all 
places, lend each other aid and assistance, while regarding them- 
selves towards their subjects and armies as fathers of families."1 
Governments and their subjects should consider themselves as "liombers 
of one and the same Christian nation. ■■ Thus peace was to be found 
in a society in which all sovereigns and their people were to act 
as true Christians. The mere enunciation of so sublime a truth v/as 
sufficient in the Tsar's opinion to secure its enforcement.3 
The Emperor of Austria did not dare refuse the Tsar when offered 
so sacred a treaty by a man whon he thought mad, but better occupied 
with schemes of peace and goodwill than with more dangerous things. 
He accordingly signed, after altering only a few phrases in the 
document which seemed especially ridiculous or blasphemous. The King 
of Prussia, whose simple nature was more easily satisfied, immediately 
followed suit. Meanwhile the Tsar himself had approached Castlereagh, 
who irreverently called Alexander's plan, "This piece of sublime 
mysticism and nonsense, "h   Castlereagh found a loophole of escape in 
the constitutional objection that the Prince-P.egent, ruling in the 
place of his insane father, had no authority to sign.^ None the 
less, the Prince Regent addressed a letter to the Tsar assuring him 
1. Ibid. 
2. TDICT., p. 306. 
3. ffodster,  op. cit., p. U5l 
5.    Fredrick B. Artz,  Reaction and Revolution,  1811^-1832,  The Rise of 
Modern Europe,   ed. lY.lTTanser.   (I!ew York and Lon35Hs—HHrpe"r 
brothers,  ±'Jhi>),  118. 
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of his "entire concurrence with the principles laid down by the 
august sovereigns",  and "promising that it would always be his 
endeavour to conform his policy to their "Sacred Maxims."1 
Even Metternich appears at first not to have realized how valuable 
an instrument the Holy Alliance would prove for his purposes.    He 
called it a "loud sounding nothing",2 and a "monument vide et 
sonore."3 
As the Holy Alliance was to be a union of Christian states, 
the Sultan of Turkey was not invited to join. The Pope presumably 
felt that he did not need the Tsar of Russia to explain to him the 
Christian principles of peace, brotherhood or government, and he 
doubtless would have refused the invitation for membership if it 
had been proffered. Alexander did not think that such a league 
would be invalid if the Pope, as a temporal sovereign and as head 
of the Roman "Church was excluded from it. 
Progressive opinion throughout Europe was from the outset, 
alive to the potential dangers of the Holy Alliance. The fact that 
it had been concluded between Russia, Austria and Prussia, and only 
adhered to by the other powers, suggested that in some manner it 
represented an attempt on the part of the three to dominate the 
continent.1* The fact, above all, that it had been concluded as a 
personal pact between sovereigns and princes created extreme preju- 
dice and alarm. For against what or whom could these potentates be 
allying themselves unless it were against the liberal movement of 
the age? It may well be true that Alexander did not at first intend 
1. Ibid. 
2. llicolson, on. cit., p. 2^0. 
3. Helen du Coudray, Metternich, 
.     1936), 166.  
4. llicolson,   o£. cit., p.  2£L. 
Jew Haven:    Yale University Press, 
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that his Holy Alliance should become a formula of repression; it 
only became so when !.!etternich, playinc adroitly upon the Tsar's 
increasing repudiation of his former liberal sentiments, used it 
as an organ of reaction.i 
Though criticized as a hypocritical gesture, the Holy Alliance 
did reflect in some measure the genuine mood of reverence and piety 
?Mch prevailed in I8l£.    The magnitude of the military losses, 
especially from Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812 until his 
final overthrow at Waterloo in 1815,  induced a conviction in many 
minds that the world was approaching a crisis.2    A horror of such 
insensate bloodshed,  and the urge to prevent future wars, by diplomatic 
accords, but even more by perpetuating among princes and peoples a 
genuine love of peace,   stirred many sincere humanitarians.    In its 
nood and purpose the Holy Alliance was an expression of this sentiment.3 
Pious in its intention, autocratic in its practice, the Holy Alliance 
itself is a curious mixture of the ingredients of the early nineteenth 
century. 
Several months after the proclamation of the Holy Alliance,  the 
American charge' d'affaires at the Court of St. Petersburg wrote to 
the Secretary of State: 
The treaty of triple alliance concluded at Paris well before 
S~u?!£*!I tohand,   is already known to you.    This treaty, a portion 
of .vhich originated with the Emperor Alexander, and which does 
equal nonor to ins head and heart,   I fear will not answor the 
magnanimous purposes for which it was designed.    If such were the 
case we should behold Europe ready to embrace the arts of peace, 
and see dissolving at once those monstrous combinations which have 
already lifted the world from its axis and now threaten to consummate 
the work of human woe.*1 
1. Ibid. 
2. SHz,  op. Cit., p. 182. 
|3.    Bruun,  qp."cit., p. £L2. 
™' P*iooof °fti — ^ Alliance,     (New York:    Oxford University ly22),  lio. 
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But the weaknesses of the Holy Alliance rendered it politically- 
ineffectual.    It had no executive and no legislative body, it contained 
no specific organization.    It was merely a loose league of kings,  even 
failing to provide means for the settlement of international disputes. 
The Holy Alliance was a league of sovereigns and not a league of 
nations.1   Beneath its defects, however, was the idea of a unified 
Europe, in which justice and good -rill would take the place of suspicion 
and intrigue. 
1.    Hemleben, op_.  cit., p. 101 
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The Quadruple Alliance 
The Holy Alliance did not do the practical work of maintaining 
the peace.    That MM left to the Quadruple Alliance.    The Quadruple 
Alliance -was formulated at Chaunont in IJarch 18LU by Great Britain, 
Russia, Prussia, and Austria, and received its final shape at the 
Second Treaty of Paris, November 20, 1815.    The Alliance was to be 
not merely defensive but a Genuine league of nations, bound not "By 
the vague confession of Legitimist faith, but by specific agreements."! 
By this Act the contracting parties promised to maintain the Second 
Peace of Paris, to support any party which should in the future be 
attacked by France, and "To renew their meetings at fixed periods, 
either under the immediate auspices of the sovereigns themselves,  or 
by their respective ministers, for the purpose of consulting upon 
their common interests, and for the consideration of those measures 
which at each of those periods shall be considered the most salutary 
for the repose and prosperity of Nations, and for the maintenance of 
the Peace of Europe."2 
Herein is the difference between the often confused Holy Alliance 
and the Quadruple Alliance.    The Holy Alliance was an expression of 
Christian sentiment, coupled with a vague promise on the part of the 
nonarchs that they would in all places and on alloccasions lend aid 
one to another.    This agreement had no binding force on any of its 
members.3    The Quadruple Alliance of November l8l£, was quite different 
from this.    It was a definite contract with a specific condition, a 
casus fo£deris^according to which,   if a certain eventuality occurred, 
1. Hemleben,  0£. cit., p. 102. 
2. R. B. IlowatT A""HTstory of European Diplomacy, l8lg-1911i.   (London: 
Edward Arnold Comoany," 1922), 25.       
3. Cresson,   op_. cit., p. 32. 
u.    liowat, Europoan~t)iplomacy, p.  26. 
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any of the contracting parties could claim the support of 60,000 
troops fron each of the others.    Secondly it contained a guarantee, 
not of all the multifarious provisions of the Congress of Vienna, 
but of one particular and limited Act,   namely the Treaty of Peace 
with France,  signed the previous November in Paris.    The Powers 
certainly thought it desirable that the execution of the Treaty of 
Vienna should be guaranteed too, but tliat vrould have been an endless 
task.    But this treaty with France was to be the ba3ic rule of the 
European system and must at all cost be maintained.    And Thirdly, 
the Quadruple Alliance pledged its members to meet together from 
time to time, and so began the salutary system known as the Concert 
of Europe. 1 
Castlereagh believed sincerely that the conference device 
sanctioned by the Quadruple Alliance would transform the methods of 
the old diplomacy and create a new and useful system of intercourse 
between sovereign states.    Castlereagh had found it necessary to 
abandon and repudiate his original conception of a general guarantee, 
and he finally became reconciled to the fact that only through direct 
intercourse, using the conference machinery, could the Concert of 
Europe be maintained. * 
In the opinion of Metternich the peace of Europe rested on the 
treaties about which his diplomacy was to revolve for the next thirty 
years.3    His own reflections on the essence of politics are indicative 
of the role he was to play: 
Politics is the science of the vital interests of States in 
Its widest meaning. Since, however, an isolated state no longer 
exists, and is found only in the annals of the heathen world,we 
must always view the society of states as the essential conditidn 
1.    Ibid.,  pp.   26-27. • 
^.    Uicolson,  on. cit., p.  2hh. 
3.    du Coudray,  op_.  cit., p.  167. 
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of the modern world...The great axioms of political 
science proceed from the Icnowledge of the true political 
interests of all states; it is upon these general interests 
that rests the guarantee of their existence...that characterizes 
the modern world and distinguishes it from the ancient is the 
tendency of states to draw near each other and to form a kind 
of social body based on the sr-ne principle as human society... 
In the ancient world isolation and the practice of the most 
absolute selfishness without other restraint than that of 
prudence was the aura of politics...Modern society on the other hand 
exhibits the application of the principle of solidarity and of 
the balance of power between states...The establishnant of inter- 
national relations, on the basis of reciprocity under the guarantee 
of respect for acquired rights,...constitutes in our time the 
essence of politics of which diplomacy is merely the daily appli- 
cation. Between the two there is, in my opinion, the same 
difference as cetween science and art.l 
After 1315 Metternich found a positive use for what was in the 
days of Chaumont the Quadruple Alliance directed against Napoleon; he 
constructed a system of European government based on the settlement of 
18U[-1G15. This system of government was not given to Surope in 
accordance with any set of principles. Each factor was governed by a 
different series of problems, a different set of partisans, of enmities 
and ambitions. Metternich co-ordinated them. Whore Aloxander thought 
in terms of Christian brotherhood and Castlereagh in terms of British 
integrity to be preserved in the face of a restless, violent France 
and an armed Russia, Lletternich thought in terms of international 
security. He built up his political edifice on the foundations of his 
policies at Vienna. He saw not nations, but states. He saw Europe 
Governed by Europe.2 His work consisted simply in quashing subversive 
activity and thwarting liberal movements wherever they appeared; thus, 
he succeeded in maintaining the status quo, and a period of peace, no 
natter on what tanas it is achieved, is sure to have some benefits. 
1. Ibid., P. 168. 
2. m, pp. 172-171;. 
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Europe governed by Europe meant to Metternich a restored,  legitimate, 
compensated regime,  respectful of authority, despising change. 
7U 
The Concert of Europe 
During the four years after the Congress  of Vienna there was a 
real Concert of Europe.    The idea that the states of Europe were, 
or night become, a brotherhood for the maintenance of peace was in 
the minds of many people: 
The problem of a universal Alliance for the peace and 
happiness of the world has always been one of speculation and 
of hope, but it has never yet been reduced to practice,  and if 
an opinion may be hazarded from its difficulty,  it never can; 
but you may in practice approach toward it, and perhaps the design 
has never been so far realizedas in the last four years.1 
This -was the opinion of the British Foreign Office at the time of the 
Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1318. 
This Concert of Europe was planned to e:rtend the strong hand of 
international conservatism to every corner of the continent.    All 
threats of discontent on the part of the people were to be watched 
and every threatened outbreak was to be put down with celerity.    The 
Concert arranged to hold a series of international conferences to 
provide for the "Repose and prosperity of nations."2    The first 
congress held to adjust European problems was that of Aix-la-Chapelle 
in 1018,  in which only the states of Austria,   Prussia, Russia and 
Britain had a vote.    Since repentant France was ready topay her indem- 
nity in full, the foreign troops were withdrawn and she was rather 
reluctantly admitted to the Concert which then became the Big Five 
rather than merely the Quadruple Alliance.3 
The second congress v/as that of Troppau,  called in 1820 to deal 
with the revolutions in Spain andllaples.    Austria, Prussia and Russia 
drew up the famous doctrine of intervention asserting their right to 
interfere in cases where governments were changed by revolutions.    With 
1. Mowat,  The European States System, p. &. 
2. Flick, op7 cit., pV 335  
3. Ibid. 
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England dissenting,  and France assenting only -.7ith certain reser- 
vations, these three powers claimed to have the right and duty 
to employ 
peaceful or coercive measures -which,   in cases where 
important effects of a salutary influence could be obtained, 
night recall those States within the boson of the Alliance.. 
...The exercise of this right became still more urgent when 
those who had placed themselves in that position (i.e. Revo- 
lution) sought to communicate to neighbouring States the mis- 
fortune in which they had themselves plunged,  and to T>rooapate 
revolution ar.cl confusion around them.1 
Acting on this assertion,  an Austrian army suppressed the 
Neapolitan revolution. 
The third international conference held at Laibach in 1821 
authorized Austria's activities in Naples, while the Tsar of Russia 
notified the revolutionists in Greece of his disapproval of their 
uprising against Turkey.    The Congress of Verona,   convening in 1822, 
?/as confronted by a revolution in Spain and in her American colonies. 
Austria was left free to deal with a revolutionary outbreak in 
piedmont; Austria and Russia with the revolution in Greece;  and 
France with that in Spain.2 
The purpose of the Concert to preserve peace was unquestionably 
sincere, but the determination of the three autocratic members to use 
armed force to prevent peoples from disturbing the established order 
revealed the menace of the system to political progress.    The Concert 
turned out to be a league of reactionary rulers and not of nations. 
The four congresses clear]^ revealed its purposes and methods,    mien 
it changed from a high court of justice to an alliance to perpetuate 
absolutism in the name of security, forces both within and without 
1.    Mcwat,  The European States System, p.  £8. 
*•    Flick,  op_. cit., p. I5ol 
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the Concert began to destroy its power.! The stand taken by- 
Great Britain in refusing to accept the doctrine of Troppau, the 
American Monroe Doctrine, and liberal revolutions on the continent 
of Europe brought about its defeat. As early as 1327 Metternich wrotei 
"The union known by the name of the Alliance has been for some tine 
little more than a pretense."2 
Summing up the attitude of the autocratic powers, is this state- 
ment of Alexander I addressed in 1820 to the other members of the 
Concert of Europe* 
During this memorable epoch, a united Europe has 
been able to smother the spirit of revolution and to create 
a new order of things safeguarding the general interest, 
under the aegis of Universal Justice. The means by union 
this end has been accomplished are: a) the alliance of the 
Powers unalterable in its principles, yet conformable to the 
progress of events, so that it may develop into a great con- 
federation of allthe statesj b; the restoration of the 
legitimate governments in France fortified by institutions 
which unite indissolubly the rights of the Bourbons with 
Lhose of the people; c) the declarations following the 
Congress of Vienna; ar.^ d) the subsequent declarations 
made in Paris in 1815.3 
This association of states has assured the inestimable 
advantages of civil order and the inviolability of persons 
and institutions. It has consecrated and guaranteed every- 
where legitimacy, and rocgnized by the treaties now in force, 
tne territorial possessions of every state. In order to 
maintain this end, the principle of a General Coalition riust 
be established and developed by further eventual action.4 
With the Congress of Verona of 1822, the Congress Period came 
to an end. The sovereigns and high ministers of State no longer 
not, as it were automatically, to discuss any new matter in 
connection with the settlement of 1815. Nevertheless, the fruitful 
idea of the Concert went onward. The western, central, and eastern 
states of Europe now regarded themselves as a society of nations, as 
1. Ibid., p. 137. 
2. IE53. 
3. Uresson, op. cit., p. 6?. 
u. Ibid., p."7o.  
• ::. 
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guardians of European peace and civilization. In spite of their 
natural jealousies and conflicting aims, they recognized a common 
responsibility. * 
It would bo wrong to assume that the Concert of Europe broke 
down over ideological causes, say nationalism and democracy. The 
conflict over interest, over poim*, over commercial advantage, ovor 
trade privilege had its share in the eventual triumph of national 
interest and economic nationalism. The Concert, because of its 
very nature, failed for the tine to cope satisfactorily with any 
of these problems. 
1. Mowat, The European States System, pp. £9-60. 
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Young Europe,  Joseph Mazzini,  133U. 
A decade later, a young Italian romanticist Joseph Mazzini 
conceived still another plan for a European union.    Young Italy, 
the society that he had organized to secure the independence and 
unification of Italy, would be reproduced in sirailiar national 
groups throughout Europe, and these branches would be federated 
into B union called Young Europe.
1    Through this means he hoped to 
furnish Europe with a college of intellects,  a sort of intellectual 
clearing-house for all the problems of democracy and nationality in 
Europe.2 
Kis idea for the solution of the problems of the nations is 
suggested in his plans for Switzerland,    liazzini's ideal for 
Switzerland was to include it vrith the Tyrol and Savoy in a 
federation of republics, and substitute for the settlement of 
1815 a true federal authority,  representing the whole people and 
responsible to them rather than to the separate cantons.    Thi3 idea 
was embodied in the Swiss constitution of 18U8.3 
The famed Act of Fraternization was signed on April 1$, 183U, 
between Young Italy, Young Germany and Young Poland.    Young Europe 
had become, at least on paper, a reality.    Young Germany sent out 
its propagators.    Young Russia and Young Poland, an unusual pair to 
say the least, were in conference over the possibilities of union. 
There was a committee of Young Europe in Gibraltar,  and an Italian 
agent at Seville was working toward a Young Spain.    Young France was 
being born at Iyons.    Ilazzini even had reason to hope that an English 
Committee would form in London.    It appeared that the oppressed of all 
1.    Bolton King, The Life of Ilazzini,   (London: J. M. Bent & Sons, 
1902), 6T.  
*.    Stringfellow Barr, Ilazzini, Portrait of an Exile,   (Hew York: 
Henry Holt & Co7J77o\  
3.    King,  op_. cit.,  p. 6£. 
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countried were combining.  It had al3o become evident that 
democracy and interests are international.* 
In writing about the efforts of Young Europe, llazzini said 
that the "rights" for which men strove in 1709 no longer suffice 
as the basis for action. Those rights Tjere merely the negation 
of the outworn feudal organization. It is the affirmation of 
something more positive and more social than individual rights 
that Europe is in need of in l83l±. Now it is not rights, but 
duty.3 A sense of man»s duties will spring only out of religion. 
"As a political party we fell. let us rise again as a religious 
party.» The Holy Alliance of Peoples must challenge the Holy 
Alliance of the conservative monarchs. "With faith and action, 
the future is ours".5 
Three years later when the future had seemingly failed him 
and his vision of a revolution of the common people, llazzini 
WTtfte in defense of his Young Europe: 
In Switzerland they are shouting that I have deserted 
Young Europe. Well, I say and shall say that Young Europe 
has deserted me: is there among the signatories one single 
person who shares my ideas on Young Europe? I say among 
the signatories, and so much the -,-rorse for those signatories 
if they did not understand it or made mental reservations... 
And because no one shares this faith of mine, am I responsible? 
Am I abandoning, am I deserting, Young Europe, when my Young 
Europe is not yours?0 
But it was in the light of high endeavor that Young Europe, 
even Young Switzerland, Germany, Poland, Russia and France and the 
rest of the idealistic associations were formed and then expired. 
1. Barr, op. cit., p. 79. 
2. King, o£. 35T., p. 6k. 
3. Barr, op_. cTE., p. 8H. 
5. IBicT., p. 36. 
6. TO., o.lltf. 
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In spite of the failure of his dreams, llagzini believed that 
enormous latent forces in Europe awaited the forms that would 
allow them e:roression.     On that premise, there was method in his 
madness.1 
Mazzini said that Young Europe would create a new philosophy, 
a new literature, a new political economy.    He felt that the 
absolute governments would surely-try to take advantage of every 
opportunity to stamp out the Swiss form of government, the republican 
state, and that only one thing could prevent this catastrophe—a 
league of freemen of all countries,  an organization like his Young 
Europe. 
In the  "General Instruction for the Initiators", ISazzini 
defined terms of international organization and association as 
this: 
Young Europe is an association of men believing in a 
future of liberty,  equality,   and fraternity,  for all mankind; 
and desirous of consecrating their thoughts and actions to 
the realization of that future. 
No true association is possible save among free men and 
equals. 
By the law of God,  given by Him to humanity, all men are 
free,  are brothers,   and are equals. 
Liberty is the right of every man to exercise his 
facilities without impediment or restraint, in the accomplishment 
of his special mission,  and in the choice of the means most 
conducive to its accomplishment. 
Equality implies the recognition of uniform rights and duties 
for all men—for none may escape the action of the law by which 
they are defined —and every man should participate in proportion 
to his labour,  in the enjoyment of the produce resulting from the 
activity of all the social forces. 
Fraternity is the reciprocal affection, the sentiment which 
inclines man to do unto others as he would that others should do 
unto him. 
1.    Ibid., p.  83. 
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All privilege is a violation of Equality. 
All arbitrary rule is a violation of Liberty 
All acts of ogoisn are violations of Fraternity.1 
These are the ideas that thrived in an age dominated by 
IJettornich.    These are the revolutionary concepts that were feared 
by the autocrats of the nineteenth century.    The romantic,  nationa- 
listic movement,   ignored by the status quo statesmen,  contained the 
pulse and feeling of the peoples of subjected countries.    The idea 
of the national mission, and the association of all freemen of all 
countries could find expression only in riot and revolution in this 
age. 
The Europe of Ilazzini's day, like the Europe of the time of 
licnrylV,  of Louis XIV,  of Napoleon I,  and of L'etternich, was not 
politically and philosophically mature enough to accerrt the idealistic 
principles of Young Europe.    But the fact that the democratic,   equali- 
tarian aspect of European confederation had been realized,   even by a 
romantic visionary,  is a significant point in the history of peace 
and international relations.    The European states system had evolved 
to the place where nationality and democracy, the contrasting twins 
of the French Revolution, were recognized and accepted as factors 
for consideration. 
1.    Ignazio Silone, The Living 
Longmans,  Green & Co. 
lew York: 
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Conclusion 
The problem of the formation of a system for the preservation 
of European peace was not solved either by the schemes of the 
philosophers and visionaries,   or by the actual settlements of 
diplomatic events in the seventeenth,  eighteenth or nineteenth 
centuries.    The solution of the same problem has been attempted 
trri.ee in the twentieth century with no apparant guarantee of 
permanent results.    Thus,  in this evolutionary process of the 
development of human relations along social,  economic, religious, 
cultural and political lines,  the present day historian must not 
condemn past failures when his own generation with its added 
advantage of hind sight has given no better answer to the problem 
of peace. 
The diplomatic settlements,  the treaties of Westphalia, 
Utrecht, Vienna, that this paper has considered in some detail, 
are the result of the realistic actualities of the seventeenth, 
eighteenth and nineteenth century European politics.    The rise of 
the modern national state,  indelible results of the balance of 
power, the false hope of peace by the concert method, all these 
trends were legalized by the various congresses of Europe during 
the three centuries.    Often treaties simply acknowledge existing 
conditions, merely echo the temper of the times—the ideas of 
thinkers,  the ambition of rulers, the aims of the classes, the 
schemes of diplomats.    To a certain extent, this analysis holds 
true of the treaties of Westphalia, Utrecht and Vienna.    But over 
and above this,   each of these settlements, in addition to restoring 
peace with the end of a major European war,  contributed materially 
toward the building of the modem states system.    Westphalia,  the 
33 
first of the great European conferences, recognised and established 
the States System.    It cane to be considered as a great instrument 
of public lav;,   standardizing that system and providing authoritative 
guidance in any dispute threatening to upset the equilibrium -rhich 
it had established. 
The Peace of Utrecht, restoring once more the equilibrium that 
had been threatened by Louis XIV, sanctioned the principle of 
balance of power as the accepted instrument of the European States 
System.    The increased power of Savoy in Italy and of Prussia in the 
Gernanies,  is a typical example of the results of the balance of 
power. 
With the Congress of Vienna and its reorganization of the 
States System on the basis of co;Tponsation and legitimacy, the 
prospect of European peace brightened.    The concert principle as 
advocated by the rulers of Europe, as evidenced by the conferences 
follordng the Vienna settlement, was considered adequate to cope 
with future international problems.    These three treaties were 
necessary in the evolution of Llodern Europe.    The nineteenth 
century, the product of these diplomatic settlements, happened to 
be without major war«J  the same period could have been the realiza- 
tion of the dreams of the philosophers had not the principle of 
federative polity fallen in the face of nationalistic ambition.1 
1.      This is the concept of 'federative polity' applied herein to 
problems of federalism within a state, confederation among states, 
and quasi-confederal relations of states generally.    It...is the 
polity that emphasizes the political relations of adjustment amonr 
equals rather than the political relationships of inferiority and 
superiority,  and of methods of lavr rather than methods of force.." 
Kobert Binkley, Realism and Nationalism, 1852-1871, The Rjse of 
"ggg Europe,   ed. WTL.  Longer,   XKevr York:    Harper BroEhere 
193577 Six. 
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On the theoretical side of the peace question, this paper 
has considered the schemes of men on the European scene in the 
seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.    None of these 
plans, from the Grand Design to the Association of Young Europe, 
vrere ever put into practice,  p_er se.    However, the contributions 
of these nen have not remained in the realm of ideas alone.    Some 
of the concepts which they put into circulation, have had definite 
effect on the history of peace. 
The religious solution affected by the Grand Design was adopted 
in the settlement of Westphalia; the political organism of federation 
has been advocated since,  even in our tine, as a medium through -which 
European peace might be achieved.    From the foundation established by 
Hugo Grotius,   international lav; has evolved into a very real force 
in the activities of nations.    The ideal of universal disarmament 
as voiced by the Abbe Saint-Pierre is still considered one of the 
most logical methods for the preservation of the general peace.    From 
Innanuci Kant the nineteenth century v/as inspired toward the goal 
of republicanism, that form of government being the most conducive 
to membership in an effective league of peace-seeking nations.    The 
political ideas of Alexander I, as evidenced in his Instructions to 
llovosiltzov -.nd in his Holy Alliance,  are typical of the dualistic 
thought of the century.    On the one hand is the pragmatic plan for 
European union under the guidance of Great Britain and Russia and on 
the other hand is the paternalistic impractical plan of Christian 
idealism; realism .and romanticism in the thought of one man in the 
nineteenth century is echoed in the activities of nations in the 
same period.    The Association of Young Europe as envisioned   by the 
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ronantic Kazzini had a short-lived existence but one of its aims 
v/as fulfilled when Europe as a whole took cognizence of the 
principles of nationalism and democracy; these were the offsprings 
of the French Revolution,  the ideas that had been ignored by the 
Congress of Vienna.    Thus,  to say that the efforts of these thinkers 
had been fruitless, would be to maintain that such concepts had not 
played a very important role in the drama of Modern Europe. 
The ideal of European peace, or of world peace for that matter, 
remains a hope and a dream for those men who see in the light of all 
history a constant progress in the attitude of human loyalties.    From 
fanatical loyalty to the family, the tribe, the clan, the city-state, 
the nation, man may develop into a creature -.Those devotion to the 
world cause is supreme.    In this slow and tedious process, the 
seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, consciously or 
unconsciously,  made no mean contribution. 
11 
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